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Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with
Normative Speculations
Alan 0. Sykest
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) estab-
lishes a multilateral framework for the liberalization of interna-
tional trade in goods. Under the auspices of GATT, signatories
have reduced tariffs affecting hundreds of billions of dollars in
trade annually.1 GATT also constrains the use of quotas and other
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports,2 the use of inter-
nal tax and regulatory policies to favor domestic over foreign pro-
ducers,3 and a variety of other protectionist devices.
Because of the extensive GATT restrictions on government in-
terference with international markets, it is tempting to view the
Agreement as a high-minded, trade-liberalizing undertaking, de-
voted to the pursuit of free trade and to the defeat of protectionist
forces. But scholars have long argued that such a view of GATT is
naive, and that it must instead be understood as an expedient bar-
gain among the self-interested political leaders of GATT signato-
ries. 4 Although GATT can largely be justified by sound arguments
about the public interest in a liberal trading order, it is best under-
stood with the aid of public choice theory.
The subject of this Article is a particular GATT provision that
is indeed difficult to comprehend without the public choice per-
spective-Article XIX, which allows signatories to renege upon
their commitments to reduce trade barriers. More precisely, Article
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XIX allows member nations to suspend GATT obligations when
increased imports "cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers" of competing products "to the extent and for such time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury."5 In GATT
parlance, a protective measure under Article XIX is a "safeguards"
action. Article XIX is also often termed the GATT "escape
clause," as it allows signatories to "escape" from their GATT
commitments.
Numerous GATT signatories, especially the United States, the
European Community, Canada, and Australia, have invoked Arti-
cle XIX to afford protection to a range of "injured" industries.6
For example, Article XIX provides the GATT foundation for a
comprehensive system of import restraints designed to protect the
U.S. steel industry. 7 Other U.S. producer groups that have bene-
fited from safeguards measures include apparel manufacturers,
footwear manufacturers, the lone U.S. producer of motorcycles
(Harley), and producers of various agricultural products."
Related to Article XIX, although outside its formal ambit, are
various negotiated agreements between importing and exporting
nations for limitations upon the quantity of exports. Such "volun-
5 GATT Art XIX(1)(a). Article XIX(1)(a) reads in full:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred
by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product
is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quanti-
ties and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
' Between 1950 and 1986, Article XIX was invoked 132 times: 28 times by the United
States, 19 times by the European Community, 22 times by Canada, 38 times by Australia,
and 25 times by other GATT signatories. Gary Sampson, Safeguards, in J. Michael Finger
and Andrzej Olechowski, eds, The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations 143, 147 (World Bank, 1987). See also Uruguay Round Negotiators Begin
Talks On Proposed Text for Safeguards Pact, 6 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 869 (1989) (discuss-
ing prevalence of voluntary restraint agreements pursuant to Article XIX).
' See, for example, President Rejects Import Relief Plan For Steel Industry, Sets
"New" Policy, 1 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 296 (1984); U.S. Opens VRA Talks with Foreign
Producers; Dispute Erupts over Marking Requirement, 1 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 497
(1984); EC Agrees to Limit Pipe and Tube Shipments to 7.6% of Market in Bid to Settle
Dispute, 2 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 4 (1985); U.S., EC Reach VRA Agreement Providing for
Small Increase in EC Quota, Officials Say, 6 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 1340 (1989).
' See, for example, John H. Barton and Bart S. Fisher, International Trade and In-
vestment 246-49 (Little, Brown, 1986) (listing U.S. escape clause cases from 1976-1983);
Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade Relations:
Issues of Protectionism in GATT European Community and United States Law 31-50
(Kluwer, 1985) (listing Article XIX actions by all nations from 1950-1978).
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tary export restraints" (VERs) have proliferated in recent years.'
The restrictions on Japanese exports of automobiles to the United
States during the 1980s' 0 and the Multifiber Arrangement, a long-
standing network of agreements governing world textile trade,", ex-
emplify these agreements.
Many academics and government officials argue that Article
XIX warrants revision. Developing countries contend that devel-
oped countries systematically use safeguards measures for ex-
tended periods of time to protect their declining industries from
the emergence of more efficient competitors. 2 Developed countries
contend similarly that their trading partners abuse Article XIX for
protectionist ends.'3 These criticisms of Article XIX have led to
various reform proposals to constrain the circumstances in which
Article XIX may be invoked and the protective devices that may
be employed.'14
Other writers argue, however, that Article XIX is too restric-
tive of the conditions under which "escape" from GATT obliga-
tions is permitted, causing the modern proliferation of VERs.
VERs, they argue, undermine the legal authority of the GATT sys-
tem, introduce the evils of discrimination into a trading regime
grounded in principles of nondiscrimination among trading part-
ners, and afford protection of open-ended duration. Thus, some
writers favor easing restrictions upon safeguards actions to en-
courage greater resort to Article XIX,6 coupled with clear prohibi-
tion of discrimination in safeguards remedies.' 6
' See 6 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 869 (cited in note 6). VERs are also frequently termed
VRAs (voluntary restraint agreements). -
"0 See Barton and Fisher, International Trade and Investment at 234-41 (cited in note
8).
" See GATT Secretariat, Textiles and Clothing in the World Economy (1984), ex-
cerpted in John H. Jackson and William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Eco-
nomic Relations 638-42 (West, 2d ed 1986).
12 See Patrizio Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GATT, 15 J World Trade L 41, 56
(1981).
15 See J. David Richardson, Safeguards Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, in
Robert E. Baldwin and J. David Richardson, eds, Issues in the Uruguay Round 24 (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1988).
"' See id at 33-36; Alan 0. Sykes, GATT Safeguards Reform: The Injury Test, in
Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert C. York, eds, Fair Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy
Laws 203 (C.D. Howe Institute, 1990).
5 See Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, Saving Free Trade 102-03 (Brookings,
1986); Gary C. Hufbauer, Trade Policy for Troubled Industries 59-61 (Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, 1986).
6 Discriminatory safeguards are measures applied selectively to some exporting coun-
tries but not to others. See Sampson, Safeguards, in Finger and Olechowski, eds, The Uru-
guay Round at 148 (cited in note 6).
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These proposals and others have been the subject of discus-
sion during the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. As
of this date, the eventual outcome of those negotiations remains in
doubt, and the possibility exists that disagreements over agricul-
tural policy may scuttle the Uruguay Round altogether. Neverthe-
less, negotiators in the safeguards group have concluded a draft
"Agreement on Safeguards" to "clarify and reinforce the disci-
plines of the General Agreement, and specifically those of its Arti-
cle XIX.' 1 7 The draft declines to resolve certain issues of lingering
controversy, such as the permissibility of discrimination in safe-
guards remedies and the obligation of signatories to abandon
VERs, but does clarify other aspects of Article XIX and introduces
some significant departures from its original text.
This Article draws upon public choice theory and the econom-
ics of contracting to explain the particulars of existing law and
practice under Article XIX, as well as certain areas of agreement
and controversy under the draft Agreement on Safeguards. The
analysis also yields useful insights into the merits of various reform
proposals.
The point of departure is the observation that GATT is a con-
tract, and that parties to contracts have an incentive to include
provisions that are "Pareto optimal" or "efficient" from their per-
spective."8 This proposition raises a number of questions about Ar-
ticle XIX. Why is the opportunity to renege on commitments to
reduce trade barriers, under the conditions specified in Article
XIX, an "efficient" part of the bargain? What is the relationship
between "efficiency" from the perspective of the negotiators of
GATT, and "efficiency" from a societal standpoint? This Article
explores these questions and others, developing their positive and,
to a lesser extent, normative implications.
In particular, the proposition that GATT is an astute bargain
among the self-interested political officials of signatory countries
provides ready explanation for the existence of an escape clause in
GATT, for the central features of the injury test under Article
XIX, and for the convergence of modern safeguards practice on an
equilibrium in which signatories effectively ignore certain textual
17 See GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 183-92 (Nov 26, 1990) (unpublished; on file with
U Chi L Rev) ("draft Agreement on Safeguards").
18 See, for example, Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell
J Econ 466 (1980). More precisely, the parties to any contract have an incentive to incorpo-
rate provisions that allow a Pareto improvement ex ante, with due regard to the transaction
costs of negotiating and enforcing those provisions.
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prerequisities for safeguards action. When coupled with concerns
relating to the control of strategic behavior, this proposition fur-
ther explains the compensation and retaliation provisions of Arti-
cle XIX, their retention in the draft Agreement on Safeguards in
modified form, and the relationship between Article XIX and
other GATT provisions that permit the renegotiation of commit-
ments. Finally, it suggests why the controversy over discrimination
in safeguards remedies has proven so difficult to resolve despite the
adherence to principles of nondiscrimination elsewhere in GATT.
The normative component of the analysis, decidedly more
speculative in character, considers the relation between the effi-
ciency of the GATT escape clause from the political standpoint of
its negotiators and its "second-best" efficiency from a social wel-
fare standpoint.19 A tradeoff likely exists between trade liberaliza-
tion ex ante and opportunities to reimpose protection ex post.
When self-interested political officials must decide whether to
make trade concessions under conditions of uncertainty about
their political consequences, the knowledge that those concessions
are in fact "escapable" facilitates initial trade concessions and may
reduce the social costs of protection over time. This defense of Ar-
ticle XIX, though conjectural, is nonetheless far more convincing
than popular rhetoric about the importance of the escape clause
for restoring competitiveness or facilitating an orderly contraction
in declining industries, or the hypothesis that escape clause mea-
sures provide an ex post "safety valve" for protectionist pressures.
Further, because of the linkage between ex post protection and ex
ante liberalization, it is exceptionally difficult to ascertain how to
improve Article XIX even putting aside the question whether im-
provement is politically feasible. The adoption of proposals to
eliminate discriminatory safeguards actions might prove counter-
productive, as might the adoption of certain proposals to en-
courage greater use of Article XIX in preference to VERs. The
elimination of the compensation/retaliation provisions of Article
XIX would be especially troubling in this regard.
I. SOME PRELIMINARIES: THE ECONOMICS OF PROTECTION FOR
"INJURED" INDUSTRIES
Political rhetoric often holds that the protection of "injured"
industries directly promotes defensible public policy goals. Such
19 "First-best" efficiency from a social welfare standpoint, as discussed in Section I,
would likely entail binding commitments to free trade without any escape clause.
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rhetoric even finds its way into formal legislative pronouncements.
For example, the statute that provides domestic authority for es-
cape clause action in the United States20 directs the President to
impose protective measures when they will facilitate "a positive
adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic
and social benefits than costs."'21 Such benefits ostensibly arise
when, as a consequence of protective actions, (1) "the domestic in-
dustry is [then] able to compete successfully with imports"'22 or
"the domestic industry experiences an orderly transfer of resources
to other productive pursuits"; 2 and (2) the "dislocated workers in
the industry experience an orderly transition to productive pur-
suits. ' 2 These notions that protection will allow an industry to be-
come competitive again or will facilitate its "orderly" contraction,
thereby generating greater "social benefits than costs," provide a
popular and politically expedient justification for escape clause
actions.
This section disputes these popular notions, arguing that pro-
tection for "injured" industries cannot be justified by principled
efficiency or equity arguments regarding its effects upon the pro-
tected industry and workers. Rather, only the public choice per-
spective elaborated in Section II provides a convincing positive ac-
count of and a plausible normative justification for GATT
safeguards policy.
A. Economic Efficiency
Economists conventionally posit that the objective of trade
policy is, as Adam Smith phrased it, to maximize the wealth of
nations. The field of international economics thus devotes much
attention to the effects of trade policy on the economic "efficiency"
or "welfare" of the country that implements it. The change in eco-
nomic welfare due to policies such as tariffs and quotas is meas-
ured by the change in the sum of national producer surplus,25 na-
20 Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC § 2251 et seq (1988).
11 Id at § 2258(a)(1)(A).
22 Id at § 2251(b)(1)(A)(i).
22 Id at § 2251(b)(1)(A)(ii).
24 Id at § 2251(b)(1)(B).
25 Producer surplus is equal to the sum of economic profits and rents earned by firms
and workers. An economic profit arises when the return on the operation of a firm exceeds
the "competitive" return on investment capital. An economic rent arises when the sale of a
factor of production (such as land or labor) yields a price in excess of the price available in
that factor's next best alternative use.
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tional consumer surplus,26 and national government revenue.
1. Background: The unilateral and multilateral effects of pro-
tectionist policies.
Classical economic theory holds that trade restrictions of any
sort often reduce the economic welfare of importing nations, let
alone the trading community as a whole. A tariff or quota. will
cause the price of an imported good to rise. Domestic consumer
surplus may well fall, the story runs, by more than the combined
increase in government revenue and domestic producer surplus.
The reason for the net loss is twofold. First, the price increase in-
duces some consumers to exit the market, and their consumer sur-
plus is altogether lost-it is not captured as an increase in pro-
ducer surplus or government revenue. Second, the price increase
induces an increase in domestic output, but the marginal cost of
the additional units exceeds the price of the imports that they re-
place, and thus the importing nation pays an unnecessary premium
for these units.28 Therefore, if an importing nation seeks to maxi-
mize its own economic welfare, a policy of free trade may be in its
best interest, regardless of the policies adopted by its trading
partners.
Such analysis relies, however, on a static, competitive model of
a market in a "small" country. It assumes that output and input
markets are competitive and at all times in equilibrium, that no
nonpecuniary externalities exist, and that the importing nation is
unable to influence through trade restrictions the price that it pays
for its imports (or, more precisely, that it is unable to influence its
"terms of trade"-the relative price of imports and exports). Over
the years, economists have developed a variety of welfare-based ar-
guments for protection when these conditions do not hold.
" Consumer surplus arises when a consumer's reservation price-the consumer's maxi-
mum willingness-to-pay for a good or service-exceeds the price actually paid.
2' The inclusion of government revenue (usually tariff revenue) as part of "surplus" is a
simplification. In a complete model of the economy, government receipts are spent and a
complete accounting of producer and consumer surplus will capture the entirety of the
change in national economic welfare.
28 See, for example, Peter B. Kenen, The International Economy 175-80 (Prentice-
Hall, 1985). Of course, government revenue will not increase at all under a quota system
unless the government sells the quota rights. For the more complex but nevertheless adverse
"general equilibrium" effects of protection, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan,
Lectures on International Trade 152-66 (MIT, 1983).
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For example, a nation large enough to influence the price of
the imports it purchases 2 can behave as a monopsonist-it can im-
pose a tariff or auctioned quota to restrict imports to the monop-
sony optimum, capturing monopsony rents through the tariff or
quota auction revenue.30 Similarly, a country that purchases im-
ports from a foreign monopoly or oligopoly can use tariffs to ex-
tract monopoly rents because the foreign monopolist will ordinarily
respond to a tariff by reducing price and thereby ceding some of its
monopoly rents to the government imposing the tariff.31 Alterna-
tively, if a domestic industry generates positive externalities, and
those externalities are lost when production occurs abroad, then
protection may be used to induce expansion of domestic producers
at the expense of foreign producers and thereby shift external ben-
efits from foreign economies to the domestic economy.32
For two reasons, however, these departures from the competi-
tive model do not provide an economic justification for the protec-
tion of "injured" industries in general, or for Article XIX in partic-
ular. First, and most obviously, none of these arguments for
protection relates closely to the condition of the industry in ques-
tion, yet Article XIX requires actual or threatened injury to an
industry.
29 That is; the nation is large enough that it faces an upward sloping supply curve for
imports of some goods.
1o Under an auctioned quota, the large nation requires producer countries to bid for
quota allotments, thus allowing the government to capture monopsony rents similar to the
manner in which it captures such rents from a tariff. The study of how nations may exploit
their monopsony power in trade is generally termed "optimal tariff theory." See, for exam-
ple, Avinash K. Dixit and Victor Norman, Theory of International Trade 150-52 (Cam-
bridge, 1980); Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade at 174-84 (cited in
note 28).
31 See, for example, James Brander and Barbara Spencer, Tariff Protection and Imper-
fect Competition, in Henry K. Kierzkowski, ed, Monopolistic Competition and Interna-
tional Trade 194 (Clarendon, 1984).
32 Because of difficulties in appropriating the returns to innovation, research and devel-
opment activities are often thought to generate positive externalities. If knowledge spreads
primarily through word-of-mouth and exchange of personnel, these externalities may be
confined to the locality or nation of the innovator. Such analysis has often been advanced to
justify-protection for certain high-technology industries. See, for example, Paul R. Krug-
man, Is Free Trade Passe?, 1 J Econ Persp 131, 137-38 (Fall 1987).
-A closely related argument for protection arises when an oligopoly includes both domes-
tic and foreign producers. In that case, protection not only serves as a device for the extrac-
tion of rents from foreign producers but also facilitates the expansion of domestic oligop-
olists at the expense of foreign oligopolists. If such expansion allows the domestic
oligopolists to reap economies of scale or to increase their share of oligopoly rents in world
markets, a further gain in domestic welfare may arise in-the form of increased producer
surplus. See id at 134-37; James A. Brander, Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial
Policy, in Paul R. Krugman, ed, Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Eco-
nomics 23 (MIT, 1987).
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Second, in each of these scenarios, the loss of economic welfare
abroad generally exceeds the gains to the importing country. The
exploitation of monopsony power by a large nation, for example,
introduces the inefficiency of monopsony into the trading system.
A tariff designed to extract monopoly rents from foreign producers
induces them to contract their output, thereby exacerbating the
preexisting distortion attributable to monopoly. Protection aimed
at shifting external economies from one nation to another not only
distorts consumer prices in the protected economy, but often in-
duces an expansion of comparatively inefficient domestic producers
at the expense of comparatively efficient foreign producers. 3
Policies that enhance national economic welfare at the ex-
pense of worldwide economic welfare may well be tempting in an
environment in which trading nations behave noncooperatively.
Ideally, however, the very function , of a cooperative agreement
such as GATT is to constrain or eliminate self-regarding protec-
tionist policies for the mutual benefit of all signatories. Hence, the
mere fact that protection may at times afford economic gains to an
importing country hardly provides an economic justification for
safeguards measures under GATT. Rather, an appealing justifica-
tion, if one exists, must rest on the proposition that safeguards ac-
tions afford net gains to GATT signatories in the aggregate. It re-
mains to consider whether the popular justifications for escape
clause actions-to restore competitiveness or to facilitate orderly
contraction of declining industries-suggest possible sources of
such net gains.
2. Restoring competitiveness.
The argument for safeguards measures to restore "competi-
tiveness" is straightforward. Safeguards actions provide ailing
firms with an increase in profits, enabling them to invest in new
technology and modern equipment, which will later allow them to
compete successfully in the international marketplace."4 The pur-
ported source of net gains to the international community (and to
1S To be sure, trade restrictions in the presence of nonpecuniary externalities may in-
crease domestic welfare more than they reduce foreign welfare-it all depends upon the
circumstances. Because Article XIX is in no way tailored to circumstances in which exter-
nalities are plausibly important, however, this analysis does not pursue the issue further.
3" This argument for safeguards measures is akin to the familiar "infant industry" ar-
gument for protection in international economics, which asserts that small, developing in-
dustries need a period of protection while they move down the "learning curve" and become
competitive with established foreign rivals. See, for example, Charles P. Kindleberger, In-
ternational Economics 113 (R.D. Irwin, 5th ed 1973).
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the importing nation) lies with the eventual emergence of efficient
competitors. The premise is that the protected industry will in
time lower its costs of production to the point that protection is no
longer necessary to its survival, and that the eventual savings in
production costs (or perhaps the elimination of distortions attrib-
utable to monopoly power that would otherwise exist) will more
than offset the short-term inefficiencies that arise during the pe-
riod of protection.
This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, it re-
lies on the questionable assumption that governments can accu-
rately identify and protect only those industries that can become
"competitive" (or "competitive again" in the case of declining in-
dustries). The more probable outcome is that well-organized pro-
ducer lobbies will secure protection irrespective of the impact such
protection is likely to have on the "competitiveness" of their par-
ticular industry.
Second, even if governments were competent to identify ap-
propriate candidates for assistance and would properly exclude
poor candidates, protection is not necessarily the best way to pro-
vide such assistance. Direct loans or subsidies to the troubled in-
dustry are in theory superior to protection, unless such measures
entail sufficiently higher administrative costs. Loans or subsidies to
cover periods of losses can be as effective as protection in enabling
an industry to become "competitive," but they do not introduce
the deadweight loss attributable to the protection-induced distor-
tion of consumer prices.35
Finally, and most importantly, government intervention to re-
store "competitiveness" is simply unnecessary, at least in devel-
oped countries with substantial private capital markets.3 Private
lenders will finance efforts to become "competitive" as long as the
returns from such investments justify the apparent risk. Absent
some distortion affecting the market rate of interest, therefore, ec-
onomically worthwhile investments will be financed without gov-
ernment assistance. And, at any rate of interest, investment in in-
dustries that are unwilling or unable to borrow in the capital
market diverts resources from other investments where the ex-
pected returns are greater.
35 Regarding the distortive effects of taxes necessary to finance the subsidies, and the
conventional wisdom as to why they are smaller than the distortive effects of protection, see
note 45.
-3 For developing countries, Article XVIII(2) provides a special exception that allows
"infant industry"-typeprotection.
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To be sure, if the industry in question generates some external
economy that individual firms in the industry cannot capture (per-
haps R&D spillover), the social returns to investment in the indus-
try will exceed the private returns. But other policy instruments,
such as loans and subsidies, are still preferable in theory to protec-
tion. 7 Further, the observation that protection for some "injured"
industries may generate external benefits hardly justifies the es-
cape clause now in existence, which requires no showing of an ex-
ternality.38 The suggestion that temporary protection may restore
the competitiveness of failing industries is ultimately unpersuasive.
3. Orderly contraction.
Beyond question, protection can slow the rate of industrial
contraction in response to import competition, or end contraction
altogether. But such delay is ordinarily an economic vice, not a
virtue.
Industries .contract because the price that they can command
for marginal units of production at higher levels of output is insuf-
ficient to cover the marginal costs of the inputs needed to produce
those marginal units. In competitive markets, this statement is
equivalent to the observation that those inputs are better em-
ployed elsewhere (or better left unemployed). The reason, put sim-
ply, is that the competitive price of marginal inputs is equal to
their opportunity cost, the price that those inputs can command in
their best alternative use. Thus, if the owners of the necessary in-
puts-whether land, capital equipment, labor, or raw materi-
als-collectively require a price to supply them at the margin that
exceeds the value of the additional output they will ultimately pro-
duce, it follows that those inputs collectively are more valuable in
alternative uses. It is inefficient to discourage their redeployment
to those uses.
In the transition to an alternative use, of course, some inputs
may spend a period of time unemployed, or may remain unem-
ployed forever. The laid-off worker will have to search for another
job, or may decide to stop working altogether in preference for lei-
37 See, for example, Harry G. Johnson, Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of
Domestic Distortions, in Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed, International Trade: Selected Readings
235 (MIT, 2d ed 1987).
' In contrast, other provisions of GAT do allow the imposition of protective measures
in the face of various arguable "externalities"; for example, national security concerns (Arti-
cle XXI) and measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant health (Arti-
cle XX(b)).
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sure time. A closed factory may never reopen. But in competitive
markets, there is nothing inefficient about such unemployment.
The worker who is unemployed while searching for another job
makes an efficient investment in the search, trading off the costs of
additional search time against the expected benefits of a better
compensation package or a more attractive work environment. The
worker who exits the labor force altogether does so efficiently be-
cause the value of leisure to that worker exceeds the returns to
'working at the available wage. Similarly, the factory that closes
permanently does so efficiently because it cannot operate at a level
where the price it can command for its output exceeds the mar-
ginal costs of production.
Plainly, however, these conclusions rest upon a key assump-
tion in the competitive model-that the price of marginal inputs is
equal to the price that they can command in their best alternative
use. The accuracy of this assumption might be questioned, perhaps
most often with regard to labor. The assumption that marginal
workers earn a return just equal to what they can command in
their next best employment opportunity implies that they are in-
different between their current jobs and their best alternative. In-
voluntary unemployment, therefore, does not exist. Workers who
move from higher paying jobs to lower paying jobs do so only when
the added psychic compensation fully offsets the reduction in mon-
etary compensation. Unemployed workers searching for work do so
only by choice-they expect continued search to yield attractive
job opportunities preferable to their existing job offers. These no-
tions seem at odds with the common intuition and apparent expe-
rience that unemployment is not always voluntary.
Indeed, for a variety of reasons, marginal workers may earn a
premium over what they can earn elsewhere-in economic par-
lance, a marginal "rent."3 9 Unionization and minimum wages are
one source of such rents. Excessive investment in job search due to
overly optimistic information about job opportunities elsewhere
(most likely during a cyclical downturn) is a further source of mar-
ginal rents.4 Marginal rents can also result from the subsidization
11 To be sure, other factors of production earn rents. Rents accrue to any fixed factor
such as land, and the return on investment to any indvstry-specific capital asset is often
termed a "quasi-rent." But there is probably less reason to believe that such rents will not
decline in the face of falling demand for the resource to keep the resource employed in its
most-valued use. Rather, such rents will tend to be inframarginal and will not reflect any
inefficiency in the market as discussed below.
40 qee, for example, Armen A. Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Un-
employment, in Edmund S. Phelps, ed, Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and
Inflation Theory 27 (Norton, 1970).
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of leisure by a government transfer payments system, which can
encourage workers to spend an inefficiently long period on the un-
employment rolls.4 1 And, as suggested above, truly involuntary un-
employment necessarily reflects the presence of rents to marginal
workers, whether it is an equilibrium or disequilibrium
phenomenon.42
Arising for any one of the reasons noted above, rents at the
margin in the labor market lead to an equilibrium (or reflect a dis-
equilibrium) in which wages are inefficiently high and employment
is inefficiently low.43 Protective measures will stimulate the de-
mand for domestic goods and in turn stimulate employment-they
can thereby generate an efficiency gain at the margin in the labor
market. And, even though this gain is offset by the distortion of
the product market caused by that protection, it is conceivable
that protection provides a net gain, considering the aggregate wel-
fare of all producers, workers, and consumers in the protected in-
dustry.44 At first, this observation seems to justify protection for an
"injured" industry in which a significant number of workers are
inefficiently unemployed (or perhaps "underemployed," as when a
$25 per hour steel worker is reduced to cooking hamburgers for the
minimum wage). It further suggests some advantage to "orderly
contraction," so that most workers can remain employed while
they conduct their job search, and the number of workers unem-
ployed at one time is limited.
But a number of objections arise. First, protection is quite
possibly an inferior policy instrument for addressing any problems
" Transfer programs and unemployment insurance have sometimes been advanced as
at least partial explanations for a downward "stickiness" of real wages-an apparent ten-
dency for real wages to remain stable in the face of slackening labor demand-that causes
unemployment to rise more than might be expected in an otherwise competitive labor mar-
ket. See Martin Neil Baily, Wages and Employment Under Uncertain Demand, 41 Rev
Econ Stud 37 (1974); Robert J. Gordon, The Theory of Domestic Inflation, 67 Am Econ Rev
Pap & Proc 128, 130-31 (1977).
42 On the debate over the existence and causes of involuntary unemployment, see
sources cited in note 45; Robert E. Lucas and Leonard A. Rapping, Real Wages, Employ-
ment, and Inflation, in Phelps, ed, Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Infla-
tion Theory 257, 272-73 (cited in note 40); Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23
J Econ Lit 1144 (1985).
" An important caveat is suggested by recent work on "efficiency wage" theory, which
posits, among other things, that involuntary unemployment can be an efficient adaptation to
agency costs. A useful collection of essays is George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen, Effi-
ciency Wage Models of the Labor Market (Cambridge, 1986).
4 For a diagrammatic exposition, see Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An
Economic Perspective, 89 Colum L Rev 199, 231-32 (1989).
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of inefficient unemployment, just as it is for restoring competitive-
ness. Even assuming that direct legislation to eliminate the source
of the marginal rents is infeasible (for example, repeal of the anti-
trust exemption for unions), employment subsidies are potentially
preferable to import restrictions. A properly calculated subsidy
could eliminate any inefficient disparity between the private mar-
ginal cost of labor and the social marginal cost of labor, without
introducing a distortion of consumer prices in the protected
market.45
Second, protection will shift the terms of trade. By reducing
the demand for foreign currencies to buy imports, protection will
cause the home-market currency to appreciate. As a result, over-
seas demand for domestic exports will decline.46 If rents at the
margin in exporting industries are as large as in the protected im-
porting industry, nothing will have been gained-the costs of inef-
ficient unemployment will simply have been shifted from an im-
port-competing industry to export industries.
Third, the purported efficiency gain at the margin in the labor
market can evaporate if protection causes rents at the margin to
increase. This concern is especially important when rents at the
margin are attributable to unionization. If unions know that they
are more likely to obtain protection when rents at the margin are
", In models of international trade with "sticky wages" (the source of the "stickiness"
typically left unspecified), import competition produces inefficiently high unemployment
levels because wages do not decline to clear the labor market. It is this domestic market
"distortion" that the government seeks to "correct." Neglecting the transaction costs of tax
collection and subsidy disbursement, a domestic wage subsidy is a more efficient correction
than is a tax on the imported product in the form of protection. See Bhagwati and
Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade at 212-32 (cited in note 28); Harry G. Johnson,
Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs 117-51 (Harvard, 1972); Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T.N.
Srinivasan, The Theory of Wage Differentials: Production Response and Factor Price
Equalisation, in Robeit C. Feenstra, ed, The Theory of Commercial Policy 481 (MIT, 1983);
Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, On Reanalyzing the Harris-Todaro Model: Pol-
icy Rankings in the Case of Sector-Specific Sticky Wages, in id at 498; Jagdish N.
Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, Alternative Policy Rankings in a Large, Open Economy
with Sector-Specific, Minimum Wages, in id at 505.
To be sure, a wage subsidy must be financed through taxation, and in practice all forms
of taxation (lump sum taxes existing only in theory) introduce their own distortions. But
this point does not establish that protection is the better policy instrument. Protection is,
after all, a way of providing aid to needy individuals (workers in the protected industry)
that is financed by a tax (duty) on the consumption of a particular good. Given all of the
alternative ways of financing the same amount of aid to the same individuals through in-
come, consumption, or other taxes, it is highly improbable that the duty is the most efficient
method of raising the necessary revenue. See Warner Max Corden, Trade Policy and Eco-
nomic Welfare 43-45 (Clarendon, 1974).
"' As a first approximation, one would expect any decline in the value of imports to be
offset by an equal decline in the value of exports.
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high-that is, when they resist wage concessions in favor of unem-
ployment for union members-then a policy of protecting union-
ized industries may be counterproductive.
Fourth, recall that under Article XIX, protection for "injured"
industries is to be temporary, limited to the period of "serious in-
jury." The argument for temporary protection as a response to
inefficient unemployment has little force if it merely postpones dis-
location to a future period. Such an outcome is likely where the
"injury" to the protected industry is attributable to a decline in its
competitiveness. Once protection is lifted, the unemployment
problem will likely recur.
Finally, even if the importing country would gain from protec-
tion, what of exporting countries? Protection will reduce the de-
mand for labor in exporting nations and may create unemployment
among workers in those nations comparable to any reduction in
unemployment in the importing nation. Once again, a convincing
economic rationale for a provision such as Article XIX must ex-
plain how GATT signatories gain in the aggregate, rather than
simply shifting unemployment from country to country.
For these reasons, the argument that safeguards measures can
efficiently alleviate unemployment in the presence of labor market
distortions is quite problematic. A fortiori, arguments that such
measures can efficiently alleviate unemployment affecting other
factors of production are also problematic, as such unemployment
seems less likely to be inefficient.4 7 Thus, the "orderly transfer of
resources" notion ultimately fails to provide a convincing efficiency
rationale for protecting injured industries.48
B. Equity and Redistribution
Even if protection for "injured" industries typically lowers eco-
nomic welfare in the importing nation and in the GATT commu-
nity as a whole, economic welfare is surely not the sole metric for
assessing the wisdom of public policy. Governments routinely ac-
cept reductions in aggregate social wealth for the purpose of redis-
tribution, and such policies enjoy significant popular support. The
question thus arises whether trade policy, and safeguards measures
" See note 39.
'8 Although the analysis in the text suggests that protection for industries with exten-
sive unemployment is not likely to increase economic welfare, protection in such cases may
be less inefficient than in other cases. This observation motivated another recent article by
the author on options for reform of the injury test under Article XIX. See Sykes, GATT
Safeguards Reform, in Trebilcock and York, eds, Fair Exchange at 203 (cited in note 14).
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in particular, provide useful tools for enhancing the equity of the
wealth distribution or for protecting an important "entitlement."
'For a number of reasons, the answer is likely "no."
Plainly, an increase in import competition may cause firms in
an importing country to contract or fail. Employees and their fami-
lies may then suffer serious financial hardship that the citizenry
may wish to ameliorate. But the hardships of unemployment and
economic dislocation that result from import competition are no
different in character from those that can result from domestic
competition or the vagaries of the business cycle. Hence, individu-
als who suffer financial ,reversals as a result of import competition
arguably should enjoy no special entitlement to assistance, but
rather should receive only the protection of whatever public safety
net programs the government makes available to the citizenry as a
whole.
One possible counterargument is that economic dislocation
due to import competition at times results from changes in govern-
ment policy-namely, trade concessions-and that the government
ought to establish special programs to assist individuals who are
seriously harmed by such policy changes. Some writers have ar-
gued, for example, that the removal of trade barriers by the gov-
ernment is analogous to a "taking" by eminent domain, for which
safeguards measures provide limited compensation. 49 But there are
serious difficulties with this argument. A wide range of government
policy decisions about government spending, regulation of the
workplace, and monetary policy can cause serious economic dislo-
cation, yet no entitlement to special assistance exists for those
harmed by these actions. It is unclear why changes in the level of
protection in a nation's trade policy should be treated differently.
Indeed, the mere fact that some special interest group has suc-
ceeded in obtaining protection in the past hardly seems a sufficient
basis for creating a permanent entitlement to that protection or for
requiring compensation for its removal. Such an entitlement will
only increase the expected returns to the pursuit of protection in
the political arena, leading to more rent-seeking behavior by those
desiring protection and probably to greater protection in the first
instance. 5 Yet another serious objection is that safeguards mea-
" See John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT § 23.6 at 567-73 (Bobbs-
Merrill, 1969); Jackson and Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at
539-41 (cited in note 11).
50 It is perhaps more appealing to posit that the consumer should enjoy an entitlement
to the benefits of free trade, and that the removal of trade barriers simply restores an enti-
tlement that the government had previously impaired.
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sures presently are in no way limited to circumstances in which
"injury" is the demonstrable result of a recent trade concession.5'
An alternative argument for special assistance to workers dis-
placed by import competition is that such workers, if their skills
are not readily transferable to other industries, may suffer a
greater loss of wealth than other displaced workers. When domes-
tic firms fail as a result of competition from other domestic firms,
for example, the demise of one domestic firm is typically accompa-
nied by the expansion or creation of another domestic firm in the
same line of business. Displaced workers may then have an oppor-
tunity to secure alternative employment that draws upon their ex-
isting skills and training, perhaps even in the same geographic
area. In the case of workers displaced by import competition, over-
seas relocation is rarely an attractive option. Likewise, when work-
ers are displaced by cyclical downturns in the domestic economy,
they may at least anticipate that the displacement is temporary
and that they will eventually be able to return to work in a posi-
tion that draws upon their existing human capital. Workers dis-
placed by import competition, in contrast, often have little hope of
returning to work in the same industry; instead, they confront a
choice between retraining themselves for a new line of work or ac-
cepting employment in unskilled positions. Thus, the argument
runs, special assistance is appropriate because the adverse eco-
nomic consequences of import-related displacement for the worker
and dependents are particularly acute.
It is unclear, however, whether the empirical premise of this
argument is correct. The limited evidence suggests that workers
displaced by import competition do not necessarily spend a longer
period of time unemployed or suffer a greater reduction in their
incomes than do workers displaced by other causes.52 In addition,
workers who are at risk of permanent displacement due to import
competition will receive added compensation ex ante if that risk is
known, which seemingly weakens any argument for additional pub-
lic assistance ex post. Finally, "workers whose skills are not readily
transferable" are by definition skilled workers, who tend to earn
more than unskilled workers; public aid to skilled workers tends to
benefit individuals who are considerably wealthier than the needi-
est members of society.
"1 See Section II.B.
"' See J. David Richardson, Trade Adjustment Assistance Under the United States
Trade Act of 1974: An Analytical Examination and Worker Survey, in Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, ed, Import Competition and Response 321, 333-37 (Chicago, 1982).
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But even if the arguments against special assistance for work-
ers displaced by import competition prove unpersuasive, the sug-
gestion that trade restrictions are an appropriate way to deliver
such assistance may be questioned. Just as conventional economic
wisdom suggests that other policy instruments may be preferable
to protection as a solution for any labor or capital market imper-
fections, so too it suggests that the hardship of economic disloca-
tion is better alleviated through tools other than restrictive trade
policies. Retraining programs and public employment agencies, for
example, can often reduce periods of unemployment and move
workers quickly to alternative positions in which their services can
be utilized efficiently. Special "adjustment assistance" programs
already provide added relocation and retraining assistance to
workers displaced by import competition.53 Economists have long
maintained that such programs can reduce the hardships of eco-
nomic dislocation at lower cost to the economy than protectionist
policies. Indeed, these programs not only avoid the distortion of
consumer prices that accompanies protection, but they also en-
courage the prompt movement of resources to higher-valued uses. 4
Protection, by contrast, delays the efficient reallocation of
resources.
Finally, protection is an exceptionally clumsy method of redis-
tribution. Many of the benefits will be captured by comparatively
wealthy stockholders in the companies that receive protection, and
by workers who would have retained their jobs in the absence of
protection. Other methods of redistribution provide aid directly to
needy individuals. Thus, appeals to the equity of the wealth distri-
bution or to the need to compensate for an impaired entitlement
afford especially unconvincing arguments for protecting "injured"
industries.55
" The United States, for example, has an elaborate statutory scheme in place for the
provision of adjustment assistance. See 19 USC §§ 2271-98.
" See, for example, Lawrence and Litan, Saving Free Trade at 12-33 (cited in note 15);
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade at 212-24 (cited in note 28). For
an interesting formal treatment of some of the tensions between efficiency and distribu-
tional objectives in trade policy, and how best to resolve them, see Peter A. Diamond, Pro-
tection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution, in Bhagwati, ed, Import
Competition and Response 123 (cited in note 52). See also Steven Shavell, A Note on Effi-
ciency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Mat-
ter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev Pap & Proc 414 (1981).
11 Once again, however, protection may be less objectionable when it succeeds in redis-
tributing wealth to needy individuals; this observation may provide useful guidance for the
design of incremental reforms to the safeguards regime. See Sykes, GATT Safeguards Re-
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C. The Safety Valve Hypothesis
Even if protection for injured industries is not a "first-best"
method for promoting efficiency or equity objectives, perhaps such
protection represents a "second-best" policy given the political and
institutional constraints confronting the GATT signatories. One
argument of this sort, often advanced as a justification for the "es-
cape clause" under U.S. domestic law, is the "safety valve"
hypothesis.
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows injured industries
to appeal to the U.S. International Trade Commission, and subse-
quently to the President, for temporary protection. 6 It thus af-
fords an alternative to direct protectionist legislation by Congress
and provides domestic authority for the United States to invoke its
rights under GATT Article XIX. Several writers have argued that
limited protection under § 201 is defensible because it supplants
what would otherwise be more stringent or long-lasting protection-
ist legislation: "[The escape clause] can serve as a safety valve in
the formulation of trade policy in a democratic society by relieving
pressures that might result in even more extreme. solutions from
Congress. ' 57 This hypothesis is to be distinguished from the analy-
sis below, which suggests a possible tradeoff between protection ex
post and trade concessions ex ante. Here, the claim is that without
the escape clause, greater protection would arise ex post through
direct legislation to protect the injured industry.
Whatever the merits of the safety valve hypothesis as a justifi-
cation for the domestic escape clause, it seemingly fails as an argu-
ment for Article XIX. On its face, the safety valve hypothesis sim-
ply argues for the creation of an administrative proceeding that
may afford protection for injured industries, and thereby deflect
pressures for protectionist measures away from the legislature. But
the likelihood of direct protectionist legislation also decreases if
such legislation violates international obligations and results in in-
ternational sanction. A GATT escape clause, by contrast, legiti-
mates protection whether through legislation or administrative ac-
tion. The ability of the Congress to resist special interest pressures
form, in Trebilcock and York, eds, Fair Exchange at 226-27 (cited in note 14); Michael J.
Trebilcock, Throwing Deep: Trade Remedy Laws in a First-Best World, in id at 235, 248-
50.
's See 19 USC § 2251 et seq.
57 Barton and Fisher, International Trade and Investment at 213-14 (cited in note 8).
For the most elaborate statement of the argument, see Lawrence and Litan, Saving Free
Trade at 23-27 (cited in note 15).
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for protection, therefore, would likely be greater in the absence of
Article XIX, given that Article XIX facilitates the very measures
that the special interest groups seek.
It is also doubtful that the safety valve hypothesis provides a
convincing justification for the escape clause under U.S. law. Re-
stated, the argument is that the overall level of protection will fall
if the government creates an administrative avenue for interest
groups to obtain protection, even though none of the preexisting
avenues for obtaining protection (direct legislation) have been
foreclosed. Yet, any interest group with the political muscle to ob-
tain protection through the legislative route seems unlikely to set-
tle for a lesser level of protection through the administrative route.
The administrative route simply affords a device for some groups
that lack the ability to mobilize the legislature to obtain protection
anyway. The creation of a new administrative proceeding, without
restricting the other legal devices for protection, simply lowers the
costs of obtaining protection and likely increases the level of pro-
tection in the end.
II. A POsITIvE ACCOUNT OF GATT SAFEGUARDS POLICY
As the above discussion suggests, protection for "injured" in-
dustries does not directly promote economic efficiency or distribu-
tive equity-the popular rhetoric provides neither a coherent justi-
fication nor a persuasive explanation for safeguards policy. The
question then arises: why does Article XIX exist in a cooperative
agreement such as GATT? The proposition that GATT is a mutu-
ally advantageous contract among self-interested political officials
provides a convincing answer.
A. GATT as a Political Bargain: Lessons from Public Choice
GATT was negotiated immediately after World War II. The
United States was the dominant economic power at the time and,
not surprisingly, U.S. representatives to the GATT negotiations
had a profound influence on the terms of the agreement.58 Article
XIX in particular was included largely because the U.S. negotia-
tors insisted upon an "escape clause." 59
I See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization
10-16 (Chicago, 1970).
"' See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT § 23.1 at 553-55 (cited in note 49),
and sources cited therein; John H. Jackson, The World Trading System 153 (MIT, 1989).
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The United States, like many of the other initial signatories to
GATT, is a democracy. The theory of public choice suggests that
policymaking under democratic government depends on the inter-
play of special interest forces in the political "marketplace.
6 0
There is generally no reason to expect the democratic process sys-
tematically to yield "efficient," "equitable," or otherwise "correct"
outcomes by any idealized criterion for measuring the success of
policy. Rather, elected officials will pursue their self interest. They
will "supply" policy initiatives to interest groups that "demand"
them, with the currency of the political marketplace in the form of
votes or campaign contributions, for instance. Ultimately, well-or-
ganized groups-those most adept at lobbying and most capable of
"paying" for policy initiatives-will have their interests vindicated,
while diffuse, poorly organized interest groups may suffer.6 1
The insights of public choice theory are not new to the study
of international trade. Many scholars have used them to explain
the pattern of protectionism in the developed world.62  Public
choice theory also helps explain the existence of GATT and, as
shall be seen, specific GATT provisions, such as Article XIX.
Public choice predicts that elected officials will concern them-
selves far more with the impact of trade policy on producer inter-
ests than on consumer interests. Individual firms in import-com-
peting or export-oriented industries often have much to gain from
specific trade policy measures. And, especially in industries with a
relatively small number of large firms, free-rider problems need
not seriously impede efforts to influence policy, either because each
firm has sufficient incentive to act individually or because inter-
ested firms can organize themselves to act collectively through a
trade association or lobbying coalition. In contrast, the number of
consumers is large and the amount at stake for each consumer on a
given trade issue is modest. Consequently, the costs to each con-
sumer of acting individually in an effort to influence the political
process will usually exceed the potential gains. Thus, severe free-
'o The early, seminal works on public choice and rent-seeking include James M.
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Michigan, 1962); Mancur Olson,
Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard,
1965).
" These remarks are not intended to suggest that democratic government is inferior to
some feasible alternative.
" One study that focuses specifically on protectionism in the United States is Stephen
P. Magee and Leslie Young, Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984, in
Robert M. Stern, ed, U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy 145 (MIT, 1987).
See also Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in Bhagwati, ed, Im-
port Competition and Response at 263 (cited in note 52), and sources cited therein.
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rider problems will often thwart the task of organizing consumers
to act collectively to support liberal trade policies.
Although consumers are often the major beneficiaries of trade
liberalization, their relative lack of influence on trade policymaking
need not doom them to an environment of unyielding protection-
ism. Powerful producer lobbies also have an interest in an open
trading system. Downstream industries that use imported input
products, for example, benefit directly from reduced protection
with respect to those inputs. Exporting industries can also benefit
considerably from reduced protection at home if that reduction is
coupled with reciprocal trade concessions in foreign markets to
which they export.6 3 Large multinational companies also often pre-
fer a liberal trading regime, as they frequently import from and
export to foreign affiliates.14 However, producers that import and
export relatively little and that confront significant import compe-
tition will benefit from greater protection. Thus, producer interests
are ultimately divergent.
Historically, the intensity of producer interests on each
side-free trade and protectionist-has varied over time. During
the early 1930s, the forces of protectionism reigned; by the mid-
1940s, trade liberalization became the dominant item on the trade
policy agenda. The reason for such variability in protectionist sen-
timent is not immediately apparent. Plainly, an industry can gain
from protection in good times as well as in bad times, as the exclu-
sion of imports under any circumstances allows profits and em-
ployment in the protected industry to rise. Yet, conventional wis-
dom holds that the intensity with which producer interests lobby
for protection increases as their financial condition worsens. One
possible explanation for this relationship is that elected officials
may be more willing to grant protection to an industry in difficulty
because they can justify it to their constituents by an appeal to
equity considerations. Producers, aware of this fact, increase their
lobbying efforts as the likelihood of success increases. 5 Another
possible explanation is that when an industry confronts financial
difficulties, the returns from productive activity within the indus-
OS In fact, exporters can gain from trade liberalization even without reciprocal conces-
sions. Reduced protection for the home market will increase the demand for imports and
thus for the foreign currency necessary to buy them. The home-market currency will then
depreciate relative to foreign currencies, with the result that home-market exports become
more competitive in world markets.
See Bhagwati, Protectionism at 75-76 (cited in note 4).
65 See Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in Bhagwati, ed, Import Com-
petition and Response at 273-76 (cited in note 52). This of course presupposes that high-
"-inded voters have at least some influence on policymaking.
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try may decline relative to the returns from lobbying for protec-
tion, causing a reallocation of resources toward lobbying.6 A third
possible explanation is that the long-term returns from protection
may be greater when times are hard-if the rate of return to new
investment in the industry is initially below the competitive return
that investors require, then protection can increase the rate of re-
turn without attracting into the industry new entrants who would
compete away the gains.6 In any event, the evidence suggests that
pressures for protection indeed intensify under adverse economic
circumstances.6
Although the immediate postwar era was hospitable to trade
liberalization, the GATT negotiators were not so foolish as to sup-
pose that protectionist sentiments would not revive as economic
conditions changed. Indeed, at the time of the original GATT ne-
gotiations, the negotiators anticipated that GATT would be sup-
planted within a few years by the "International Trade Organiza-
tion" (ITO), an institution that never came into existence because
of the revival of protectionist sentiments in the United States and
the refusal of the Congress to approve U.S. accession.69 The negoti-
ators thus correctly recognized that irrevocable commitments to
liberalize trade might at some point preclude them (or their supe-
riors or their political successors in interest) from providing pro-
tection in circumstances where the political rewards would be
great.
The response of GATT, for reasons that the analysis to follow
will elaborate, is to allow each signatory to avoid its commitments
if the other signatories agree, or, in the alternative, if it is willing
to bear the cost of measured retaliation. Article XXV allows signa-
tories to obtain a waiver of GATT obligations under "exceptional
circumstances" if two-thirds of the other signatories vote to grant
it.70 Article XXVIII authorizes the renegotiation of tariff "bind-
ings," the commitments among signatories that place limitations
upon tariff rates. If no agreement is reached during the negotia-
tions, a party may still raise a tariff above its bound level. How-
ever, adversely affected parties can then withdraw "substantially
66 See Magee and Young, Endogenous Protectionism in the United States, in Stern,
ed, U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy at 161 (cited in note 62).
17 See David D. Friedman, Price Theory: An Intermediate Text 549-50 (Southwestern,
1990).
41 See, for example, Bhagwati, Protectionism at 61 (cited in note 4).
19 See Jackson, The World Trading System at 32-34 (cited in note 59).
70 GATT Art XXV(5).
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equivalent concessions." 71 And, most importantly here, Article
XIX permits the suspension of GATT obligations, but such safe-
guards measures can be applied only temporarily and only when a
domestic industry suffers from or is threatened with "serious in-
jury" due to "increased quantities" of imports. Even then, nations
adversely affected by safeguards measures are entitled to withdraw
equivalent concessions in response.7 2 To avoid such retaliation, the
nations that invoke Article XIX frequently offer compensatory
concessions. 73
This system of revocable commitments is complex indeed, and
raises a number of intriguing questions. Perhaps most fundamen-
tally, even accepting that "escape" from GATT obligations may
yield political gains ex post to officials in an importing country,
why does the attendant detriment to exporting nations not offset
this gain and warrant a prohibition upon escape ex ante?74 Fur-
ther, why did the negotiators find it useful to facilitate "escape" in
alternative ways, as by including both Article XIX and Article
XXVIII? What is the function of the serious injury requirement
under Article XIX, and the requirement of linkage to "increased
quantities?" What explains the structure of the compensation and
retaliation provisions of Articles XIX and XXVIII?
The remainder of the Section suggests answers to these ques-
tions and others by melding the insights of public choice with the
proposition that GATT is a Pareto optimal bargain among self-
interested political actors. In so doing, it also suggests how the ef-
fort of the negotiators to promote their political self-interest may
indirectly promote the public interest in a liberal trading order.
B. The Function of an Escape Clause in GATT
The genesis of the analysis to follow lies in a one sentence pas-
sage from Kenneth Dam's prominent GATT treatise, in which
Dam hints that Article XIX may facilitate trade concessions.7" Re-
stated and considerably elaborated, the argument runs as follows:
Although the reduction of protectionist barriers is almost always in
GATT Art XXVIII.
GATT Art XIX.
13 See Jackson and Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at 606-
07 (cited in note 11).
7' That is, a prohibition upon escape is Pareto optimal unless the opportunity to escape
affords net gains to GATT signatories in the aggregate ex ante.
75 See Dam, The GATT at 99 (cited in note 58) ("the presence [of Article XIX] encour-
ages cautious countries to enter into a greater number of tariff bindings than would other-
wise be the case").
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the public interest, elected officials or their subordinates may de-
cline to pursue trade liberalization initiatives out of political self-
interest, even if the political consequences of liberalization appear
favorable at the time of the negotiations. The reason is that unan-
ticipated changes in economic conditions may create circumstances
in which the political rewards to an increase in protection (or the
political costs of an irrevocable commitment to reduce protection)
are great. Consequently, in the absence of an escape clause, trade
negotiators may decline to make certain reciprocal concessions for
fear of adverse political consequences in the future. But, with an
escape clause in place the negotiators will agree on a greater num-
ber of reciprocal concessions, knowing that those concessions can
be avoided later if political conditions so dictate. Though Dam ap-
parently offered this observation as a normative justification for
Article XIX, it also holds the key to an explanation of its terms,
and indeed of its very existence.
Implicit in this explanation is an important assumption-that
a formal "escape clause" is valuable to signatories that wish to "es-
cape" their obligations because adequate substitutes do not exist.
This assumption is in fact two assumptions-first, that GATT sig-
natories regard their commitments as binding and are unwilling
simply to abrogate them, and second, that future informal renego-
tiation of GATT commitments is an imperfect substitute for the
presence of a formal "escape clause." The accuracy of these as-
sumptions is not self-evident.
As to the first, GATT as an institution has no coercive power
other than the ability to deny signatories the benefits of member-
ship. Hence, if signatories (or, more accurately, their public offi-
cials) determine that GATT agreements are no longer advanta-
geous, they can simply decline to adhere to them. In this sense, an
"escape clause" is part of GATT whether or not the agreement ex-
pressly includes it.76
Yet, the fact that GATT includes express provisions governing
the withdrawal or modification of concessions indicates that such
provisions are not superfluous. Signatories apparently regard
GATT commitments as sufficiently credible and binding to make
such provisions worth drafting. The reason no doubt relates to the
fact that GATT is not a "single-play" game. Each signatory binds
itself to thousands of concessions affecting many other signatories.
The fact that GATT membership has grown steadily over time,
76 GATT might thus be characterized as a self-enforcing agreement. See Lester G.
Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J Bus 27 (1980).
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with no significant defections,7 7 suggests that these reciprocal con-
cessions in the aggregate yield net benefits to governing officials in
each signatory. To preserve those benefits and to facilitate new re-
ciprocal agreements in the future, each signatory has an interest in
maintaining a reputation for honest behavior. Hence, it is not un-
realistic to suppose that the terms of any formal "escape clause"
will be more or less respected by signatories and will thus place
meaningful constraints on their behavior.
As to the second assumption-that renegotiation is not always
an attractive substitute for a formal escape clause-it can hardly
be denied that the ability of signatories to renegotiate the bargain
exists, irrespective of the original text. And, as long as all affected
signatories are content with the renegotiated outcome, no signatory
will have sacrificed its reputation for honesty, and the integrity of
the GATT system will not have been jeopardized. The modern
proliferation of VERs, of dubious legality under the letter of
GATT, clearly reflects the relative ease with which renegotiation
can occur. But again, the very existence of Article XIX suggests
that ex post renegotiation is only an imperfect substitute for for-
mal safeguards action. The reason no doubt relates to the fact that
renegotiation is always time-consuming and does not always reach
a satisfactory conclusion for all concerned. This argument will be
elaborated below.7 8
The analysis to follow embraces the assumptions necessary to
make a formal escape clause an interesting and important part of
the bargain to refine and extend Dam's conception of its function.
It begins with a summary of a simple, formal model of the escape
clause in trade negotiations, which shows how an escape clause fa-
cilitates agreements, and develops the conditions under which "es-
cape" is Pareto optimal ex ante from the perspective of politically
self-interested negotiators. Subsequent discussion draws upon the
results of the model to provide a detailed, positive account of Arti-
cle XIX as originally drafted, of GATT practice under Article XIX
in the decades since its inception, and of prominent aspects of the
draft Agreement on Safeguards.
7 See Jackson and Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at 324-
25 (cited in note 11).
78 See Section II.B.2. (discussing why GATT allows revocation of concession without
permission and why it includes Article XIX in addition to the authorization for renegoti-
ation under Article XXVIII).
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1. A formal model.
Appendix A presents a formal model of an escape clause in a.
bilateral agreement for reciprocal trade concessions, executed by
negotiators who pursue their political self interest. It shows how an
agreement with an escape clause Pareto dominates an agreement
without an escape clause, and thus establishes that negotiators
have a mutual interest in including one. It further characterizes
the properties of a Pareto optimal escape clause, and suggests
when the agreement will permit one party or the other to "escape."
The central results of the model have ready intuitive explana-
tions. The model begins with the premise that political officials in
each country have no present interest in unilateral trade conces-
sions. Existing protective measures yield political gains or, equiva-
lently, the elimination of protective measures would impose a po-
litical cost because of the damage to import-competing industries.
But political officials recognize that the elimination of protective
measures abroad will benefit exporting industries, and thus a polit-
ical gain might be achieved through an agreement with the foreign
government to reduce its level of protection because officials in the
exporting country can take credit for such an agreement. This fact
makes agreement upon reciprocal trade concession potentially at-
tractive, and officials in each country will find it in their interest to
enter such an agreement if the political gain associated with in-
creased exports exceeds the political cost associated with increased
import competition.
Officials in each country must decide whether to accept the
agreement, however, under conditions of uncertainty. At the time
the agreement is signed ("ex ante"), the magnitude of the political
costs from increased import competition and the political gains
from increased export opportunities are unclear, and vary with the
ex post "state of the world." For example, if economic times prove
hard, the political cost associated with a lowering of protectionist
barriers at home will be greater, for reasons discussed above.
The negotiators might conclude an agreement in which the re-
ciprocal trade concessions were irrevocable-that is, once the
agreement was signed, it might provide that protection could not
be reimposed by either country regardless of the eventual state of
the world. As an alternative to such an agreement, however, the
negotiators might agree to permit the reimposition of protection
("escape") if in the eventual state of the world, the agreement im-
posed political detriment upon officials in one country or the other.
In fact, as Appendix A shows formally, such an agreement is at
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least as attractive as an agreement with irrevocable concessions (it
usually increases and never lowers the "expected utility" of each
negotiator). The reason, put simply, is that an agreement with an
escape clause is more flexible. It permits the negotiators to tailor
the bargain ex ante to maintain the concessions in states of the
world where they are mutually advantageous ex post, and revoke
one or both concessions in states of the world where their political
cost proves high.
In what states of the world will the negotiators agree to allow
escape? Note that the revocation of a particular concession bene-
fits import-competing firms in the revoking country but hurts ex-
porters abroad. Those exporters will complain to their political of-
ficials about the loss of access to their overseas market, and likely
withdraw some political support from the officials who were re-
sponsible for obtaining the original concession. Indeed, depending
upon the form of government, a loss of export earnings may di-
rectly reduce the welfare of officials in power. A Pareto optimal
agreement will nevertheless permit "escape" only in states of the
world in which the attendant political gains to officials in the im-
porting country "outweigh" the costs to the officials in the export-
ing country. Suppose, for example, that in some state of the world,
the concession by one country is highly disadvantageous to its offi-
cials, and the costs to officials in the other country if the conces-
sion is revoked would be modest. The parties may then benefit
from an agreement to allow the first country to escape its conces-
sion in that state of the world. The quid pro quo from the perspec-
tive of officials in the other country is an agreement to let them
escape their concessions in the same or some other state of the
world in which they would gain considerably and the costs to offi-
cials in their trading partner would be modest.
Note that such an escape clause agreement does not in general
provide for the reciprocal revocation of concessions. Some states of
the world may exist in which concessions on both sides are re-
voked, but other states may exist in which concessions by only one
country are revoked.
2. Implications: The function and structure of Article XIX.
The simple model in Appendix A makes clear how an escape
clause can enhance the likelihood of initial agreement and (equiva-
lently) promote the self-interest of the negotiators. But it does not
explain why GATT should contain such a variety of ways to escape
concessions and, in particular, why Article XIX is necessary given
the other GATT provisions that allow concessions to be with-
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drawn. Further, the model describes an environment in which the
negotiators choose an escape clause ex ante that specifies in detail
the states of the world in which "escape" from each concession is
allowed. In practice, however, GATT does not contain such elabo-
rate state-contingent provisions governing the revocation of con-
cessions but rather provides other procedures and criteria for "es-
cape," such as the injury test under Article XIX. These differences
between the escape clause in the abstract and in practice warrant
further consideration.
a) Article XXVIII: Renegotiation, compensation, and re-
taliation. As noted, a Pareto optimal escape clause would permit
the revocation of a concession only if the political gains to the
party who revokes the concession outweigh the political costs to
the other party. But the transaction costs of anticipating all possi-
ble contingencies in advance, and specifying whether "escape" will
be permitted under those contingencies, are no doubt prohibitive.
GATT embodies thousands of concessions, and it would be a stag-
gering task to identify all "states of the world" that bear on the
political consequences of the concessions, evaluate those conse-
quences, and agree on the proper course of action ex ante with all
interested parties. It thus comes as no surprise that GATT does
not incorporate a complete state-contingent "escape clause," and
that the GATT negotiators were forced to devise substitute proce-
dures for the modification of concessions.
What possible substitutes exist? One option is to abandon any
effort to establish conditions for escape ex ante and to rely solely
on ex post renegotiation. Thus, GATT concessions might be
deemed "irrevocable," but with explicit or implicit recognition that
a party disadvantaged by a particular concession ex post can al-
ways seek to renegotiate with interested trading partners. Escape
would then be allowed if the party seeking to avoid a concession
could secure permission from interested trading partners by offer-
ing a side-payment, probably in the form of compensatory trade
concessions.
GATT Article XXVIII indeed provides authorization and pro-
cedures for periodic renegotiation. It has been used extensively and
has provided an important vehicle for modification of tariff bind-
ings.7 " A possible disadvantage of exclusive reliance on Article
XXVIII renegotiations, however, is that the party seeking to rene-
gotiate may discover that others insist on large offsetting conces-
79 See, for example, Dam, The GATT at 97-99 (cited in note 58).
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sions. Even when the political costs of safeguards measures to offi-
cials in exporting countries are modest, those officials may hold out
for greater compensation if they know that the political impor-
tance of escape to officials in the importing nation is great. The
political gains from "escape" for officials in the importing nation
may then be all but lost, and bargaining may even reach impasse,
thus making "escape" effectively impossible unless a signatory is
willing to breach its obligations. Such a breach, in turn, might trig-
ger the unraveling of the entire agreement. The GATT negotiators
were evidently unwilling to tolerate this possibility, and Article
XXVIII provides that concessions may be revoked even if negotia-
tions over compensatory concessions are unsuccessful.8 0
But such a provision creates another problem. When a conces-
sion is revoked without compensation to other signatories, the po-
litical pressures for retaliation abroad will be considerable. More-
over, no signatory can afford to develop a reputation for passivity
following such revocations by others. If it does so, it will soon dis-
cover that its trading partners are willing to take advantage of that
reputation. Retaliation in some form is thus inevitable. One possi-
ble retaliatory strategy is "massive retaliation," in which a signa-
tory undertakes to develop a reputation for toughness to discour-
age the withdrawal of concessions in the future. But that strategy
invites escalation by the other side, counterescalation, and so
forth-a trade war. The GATT negotiators were apparently quite
wary of that prospect following the experience of the 1930s. Hence,
recognizing that retaliation was inevitable, the negotiators agreed
that any response should always be "measured retaliation"-in
other words, the harm inflicted through retaliation should be
roughly comparable to the harm inflicted by the initial withdrawal
of concessions.
Under Article XXVIII, a party that feels disadvantaged by
any concession after the "state of the world" reveals itself can
withdraw the concession, knowing that adversely affected parties
are entitled to revoke "substantially equivalent concessions ini-
tially negotiated with" that party."' Prior to such a retaliatory
withdrawal, however, Article XXVIII requires the interested par-
ties to negotiate to avoid retaliation when possible.
An interesting analogy may be drawn to the liability regime
that governs private contracts not subject to an action for specific
performance. A promisor who finds contractual obligations unduly
80 GATT Art XXVIH(3).
81 GATT Art XXVIII(4)(d).
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burdensome once the time for performance arrives can seek to re-
negotiate them. But renegotiation is not the only avenue for the
avoidance of the promise-the promisor may simply breach the
contract, and (typically) pay "expectation damages" to the prom-
isee, or perhaps "liquidated damages" set by agreement. It is well
known that such contract damages payments can promote efficient
breach decisions.2 Under GATT, parties also have the option to
"breach" if renegotiation fails, and the Agreement implicitly recog-
nizes that breach may be efficient. Thus, "damages" are not pro-
hibitive, but are limited to the withdrawal of "substantially
equivalent concessions" by others. It is perhaps instructive to view
this provision as a liquidated damages clause, inserted to police
inefficient "breach" but also to permit efficient "breach," much as
the prospect of damages judgments serves that function for private
contracts.
b) The function of Article XIX. Why is Article XXVIII
not the sole method for revoking concessions? One answer is that
the process of negotiation can be quite time-consuming. Further,
Article XXVIII specifies that renegotiation will ordinarily com-
mence at the beginning of periodic negotiating windows,83 absent a
vote by the GATT membership to authorize "out of season" nego-
tiations under "special circumstances. '84 Quite possibly, conditions
will arise in which political forces warrant more prompt action to
reinstate protection. This possibility provides one obvious justifica-
tion for Article XIX as a supplement to Article XXVIII, because it
gives signatories the option to impose protective measures immedi-
ately, leaving until later the task of negotiating a final agreement
with other signatories regarding the international consequences. 5
A second possible advantage of Article XIX arises when the
conditions that create political pressure for protection are expected
to be transitory. As noted, such pressures tend to intensify as fi-
nancial conditions in an industry worsen and to abate as financial
conditions improve. If a financial downturn is the result of cyclical
forces, or of some other shock that is expected to abate, temporary
protection may satisfy the domestic proponents of protection. And,
by invoking Article XIX rather than Article XXVIII, the import-
8' See, for example, Shavell, 11 Bell J Econ 466 (cited in note 18).
83 GAT Art XXVIII(1).
84 GATT Art XXVIII(4).
85 Signatories are required to provide "an opportunity to consult" with other signato-
ries before taking safeguards action, unless "critical circumstances" preclude prior consulta-
tion. GATT Art XIX(2).
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ing nation precommits itself only to temporary protection and thus
can expect to pay a lower price, in the form of compensation or
retaliation, for that protection. Of course, opportunistic use of
safeguards measures to provide long-term protection can jeopar-
dize that function of Article XIX. This observation may well ex-
plain why the draft Agreement on Safeguards introduces express
time limits on safeguards actions8 6
c) Injury, compensation, and retaliation under Article
XIX. Interestingly, unlike Article XXVIII, Article XIX constrains
the circumstances under which concessions may be revoked by re-
quiring an "injury test." As noted, safeguards measures are to be
employed only when "increased quantities" of imports cause or
threaten "serious injury" to the import-competing industry. The
draft Agreement on Safeguards preserves this basic structure of
the injury test.87 These features of Article XIX have a ready inter-
pretation in light of prior analysis regarding the properties of an ex
ante Pareto optimal escape clause.
Recall that such an agreement will limit escape to those states
of the world in which the benefits to officials in the importing
country outweigh any costs to officials in the exporting country.
When complete state-contingent agreements for that purpose are
too costly, an alternative is to impose general restrictions on the
revocation of concessions that limit revocation to the circum-
stances in which it is more likely to be efficient from the negotia-
tors' perspective.
As noted, the political rewards to protection tend to be the
greatest when the industry at issue is suffering serious financial
difficulties. Hence, the "serious injury" requirement of Article XIX
may be understood as an effort to limit safeguards measures to cir-
cumstances in which the ability to reinstitute protection tends to
be of greater political benefit to officials in the importing nation.
Likewise, the political costs of safeguards measures to officials in
exporting nations are likely to be the smallest when nations' ex-
porters are doing well and can absorb some reduction in exports
without suffering serious financial problems. The presence of "in-
creased quantities" of imports (measured by an increase in ship-
ments or market share) in the importing country supplies some
limited evidence that exporters are doing Well. Thus, the require-
ments of "serious injury" and "increased quantities" of imports
"' Draft Agreement on Safeguards Arts 9-10 (cited in note 17).
'7 See id at Art 2.
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seemingly provide a rough first cut at identifying circumstances in
which the revocation of concessions may afford net political gains
to officials in the interested signatories ex ante.
But because these indicators are assuredly imperfect, the
negotiators did not rely on them as the sole constraint upon safe-
guards action. Consequently, Article XIX requires that a party
taking safeguards action at some point negotiate over the possibil-
ity of compensation." It further authorizes measured retaliation
when those negotiations fail, thus utilizing the same "liquidated
damages" approach as Article XXVIII.s9 These provisions discour-
age resort to Article XIX unless the political gains in the importing
nation are sizeable and, much-like the parallel provisions in Article
XXVIII, maintain harmony by encouraging compensation and lim-
iting the retaliatory response when those negotiations fail. Article
XIX is thus something of a hybrid provision, incorporating partial
reliance on the identification of circumstances in which escape is
likely to be Pareto optimal ex ante, and partial reliance on ex post
renegotiations and accompanying provisions for restraining strate-
gic behavior.
d) The defunct prerequisites to safeguards action. Ac-
cording to the text of Article XIX, the requirement that "serious
injury" result from "increased quantities" of imports is not the
sole prerequisite for safeguards action. The "increased quantities"
must also result from "unforeseen developments" and from "the
effect of obligations incurred" under the Agreement." These provi-
sions pose interesting interpretive problems, and modern GATT
practice has converged on an interpretation that renders both vir-
tual nullities. Not surprisingly, therefore, both requirements are
omitted from the draft Agreement on Safeguards. The analysis
above suggests a ready explanation for this development.
" "Before any contracting party shall take action ... it shall give notice in writing...
as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford ... those contracting parties having
a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with
it in respect [to] the proposed action.... In critical circumstances, where delay would cause
damage which it would be difficult to repair, action... may be taken provisionally without
prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after
taking such action." GATT Art XIX(2).
89 "If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is
not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nev-
ertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting
parties shall then be free ... to suspend ... such substantially equivalent concessions or
other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the [GATT membership as
a whole does] not disapprove." GATT Art XIX(3)(a).
'0 GATT Art XIX(1)(a). For full text, see note 5.
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The very inclusion of the "unforeseen developments" require-
ment in Article XIX is puzzling. If an "unforeseen development" is
simply one that has low probability ex ante, then the Article XIX
requirement seems almost superfluous. The existence of a conces-
sion suggests that states of the world in which an importing coun-
try would wish to revoke it were regarded as reasonably improba-
ble ex ante. Alternatively, if the term "unforeseen development"
were interpreted to limit safeguards actions to contingencies that
were truly unforeseen or unforeseeable ex ante, it would defeat the
purpose of the escape clause from the negotiators' perspective. The
negotiators value an escape clause precisely because they can fore-
see certain contingencies under which the political gains from the
revocation of a concession would be great. It thus comes as no sur-
prise that under modern GATT practice (and the draft Agreement
on Safeguards), the "unforeseen developments" requirement of Ar-
ticle XIX has disappeared.
The requirement that "increased quantities" of imports result
from GATT obligations also poses interpretive problems." Under
one possible interpretation, however, this requirement is trivially
satisfied in every case-the importing country simply asserts that
but for the conjunction of a tariff binding under Article II, the pro-
hibition upon quotas in Article XI, and so forth, it would have
taken protective action to avert the increase in imports. Put differ-
ently, to determine whether increased imports are "caused" by
GATT obligations, one might compare the actual level of imports
to the level of imports that would exist in a counterfactual world in
which the importing nation was not precluded by GATT from in-
creasing the level of protection. And, because a nation seeking to
impose protection under Article XIX can surely claim with credi-
bility that it would iipose protection if GATT did not exist at all,
such a test for the causal relation between GATT obligations and
the increase in imports would be trivially satisfied.
GATT practice has converged on this interpretation,92 and the
draft Agreement on Safeguards thus omits any requirement of
linkage between increased quantities and GATT obligations. Such
a development is also readily explicable. The political rewards to
officials who supply protection to a domestic industry seemingly
bear little or no relation to the nature or magnitude of prior
changes in the level of protection during GATT negotiating
91 See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT § 23.3 at 559-60 (cited in note 49).
91 See Edmond McGovern, International Trade Regulation § 10.211 at 291 (Gobefield,
2d ed 1986).
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rounds. Even if accession to GATT does not result in a reduction
in the level of protection for a particular industry, for example, the
political rewards from a future increase in protection may be great.
Thus, unless the requirement of linkage between increased imports
and GATT obligations is interpreted so as to be trivially satisfied
in every case, it would undercut the political utility of the escape
clause.
III. NORMATIVE SPECULATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT
REFORM PROPOSALS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE
DRAFT AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
Unquestionably, important differences exist between the ideal-
ized escape clause of the formal model and the provisions of Arti-
cles XIX and XXVIII. "Escape" in practice requires signatories to
pay a price ex post, for example, while an optimal ex ante agree-
ment would not-compensation would be paid ex ante in the form
of reciprocal promises to allow escape in specified states of the
world. Nonetheless, because the negotiators anticipate the ability
to revoke concessions under Articles XIX and XXVIII, they enjoy
some assurance that particular commitments can be avoided when
the political stakes are high, using protective measures that do not
breach the agreement and hence do not seriously jeopardize the
larger network of reciprocal concessions. This assurance makes
trade concessions more attractive ex ante. Thus, Dam was surely
correct that the existence of Article XIX increases the chances of
initial agreement on concessions.
On the premise that trade concessions enhance social welfare,
therefore, does it follow that Article XIX enhances social welfare?
The answer is "perhaps," and depends on one's benchmark.
The proposition that trade concessions enhance social welfare
implies that the "first-best" world is one in which negotiators
make irrevocable commitments to liberalization regardless of the
impact on their self-interest. Then, and rather trivially, an escape
clause in any form is not "first-best."
A more interesting inquiry is whether Article XIX is in some
sense "second-best." One possible benchmark is simply the overall
level of protection. More precisely, one might define Article XIX
as "second-best" if its presence in GATT reduces the deadweight
costs of protection to the GATT community relative to a
counterfactual world in which Article XIX was omitted from
GATT.
The effect of Article XIX on the economic costs of protection
is in theory ambiguous, however, because negotiators can reach
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agreement on many concessions even in the absence of an escape
clause. In such cases, an escape clause simply creates the possibil-
ity that concessions will at some point be revoked and increases
the expected deadweight losses from protection. Thus, even though
an escape clause likely results in a greater number of concessions,
it also facilitates the revocation of concessions that would have
been made anyway in the counterfactual world with no escape
clause. The net impact on the level of protection and the attendant
deadweight losses are thus theoretically indeterminate.
Empirically, however, the fact that Article XIX has been in-
voked relatively infrequently in relation to the total number of
GATT concessions" perhaps suggests that the presence of Article
XIX is indeed beneficial."4 Further, retaliation in response to safe-
guards actions has been rare.as Signatories usually avoid such retal-
iation either by offering compensatory concessions" or by "brib-
ing" other signatories with quota rents under voluntary export
restraint arrangements. 1 When signatories make compensatory
concessions, the effects of the safeguards action on the overall eco-
nomic costs of protection may, as a first approximation, be small.
Hence, if Article XIX has indeed facilitated a significant number
of concessions-a plausible though unverifiable proposition-its
overall effect on the welfare costs of protection may well have been
favorable.
But can Article XIX be improved? To some degree, this ques-
tion is uninteresting, as the public choice perspective suggests that
Article XIX will remain a device for the politically expedient
1- Between 1950 and 1986, Article XIX was invoked 132 times. See note 6. By contrast,
GATT tariff concessions number in the tens of thousands. See Dam, The GATT at 106
(cited in note 58).
" See id at 99, 106-07. This observation is potentially misleading. A single action under
Article XIX can encompass a vast array of products imported from many signatories-the
restraints on U.S. steel imports offer a clear example. Further, it is quite unclear how many
concessions would have been thwarted by the absence of Article XIX, especially given the
presence of Article XXVIII and other provisions for the withdrawal or modification of
concessions.
95 See McGovern, International Trade Regulation § 10.213 at 294 (cited in note 92).
"' See Jackson and Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at 607
(cited in note 11).
"' As noted earlier, for example, the current system of protection for U.S. steel produc-
ers takes the form of voluntary export restraints. Under such restraint agreements, the gov-
ernments of exporting nations agree to limit their exports to the protected market. The
price in the protected market rises, and exporters capture the price increase on their al-
lowed shipments. Thus, although the actual quantity of shipments for exporters declines,
the profit per unit rises. The net result assuredly cushions the adverse effects of protection
on the profits of foreign exporters and, indeed, in some cases exporters may come out ahead.
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avoidance of concessions. The prospects for high-minded reforms
thus appear poor. Nevertheless, reform proposals abound, and the
public choice perspective has something to say about their wisdom.
A. Proposals to Tighten the Prerequisites for "Escape"
A number of commentators, the author included, have pro-
posed additional restrictions on the circumstances in which Article
XIX may be invoked. Such proposals often focus on the concept of
"serious injury" and urge that this prerequisite be more precisely
and narrowly defined. For example, one group of proposals would
limit findings of "serious injury".to cases of extensive unemploy-
ment or underemployment in the import-competing industry. es To
date, such proposals have had little influence within GATT, and
the draft Agreement on Safeguards imposes no meaningful con-
stralnts upon the ability of signatories to interpret the "serious in-
jury" requirement as they wish.99
The welfare impact of additional restrictions on escape is diffi-
cult to assess. On the one hand, Appendix A suggests that incre-
mental restrictions on escape are likely beneficial. To see why, con-
sider another possible benchmark for the "second-best" escape
clause: one might define it as the one that minimizes the expected
welfare costs of protection, recognizing that an unduly restrictive
escape clause will thwart agreement between the negotiators and
thus increase the expected costs of protection. Only on rare occa-
sions will this second-best escape clause correspond to the escape
clause that the negotiators will choose for themselves. And, on the
premise that "escape" is detrimental to social welfare ex post, the
difference between the "second-best" escape clause and the one
that the negotiators select will be systematic-the negotiators will
allow themselves to avoid their commitments "too often." Appen-
dix B provides a formal illustration. Intuitively, this proposition
follows from the fact that the politically Pareto optimal escape
clause will typically yield to the negotiators greater expected util-
ity than is necessary to induce them to enter the agreement. Con-
98 See Richardson, Safeguards Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, in Baldwin
and Richardson, eds, Issues in the Uruguay Round at 33-34 (cited in note 13) (arguing that,
in light of their growing diversification and multinational characteristics, firms should no
longer be considered domestic producers of goods, and the availability of safeguards should
depend on injury to domestic workers, communities, and immobile owners of resources,
rather than to "firms," thus narrowing the concept of "serious injury"); Sykes, GATT Safe-
guards Reform, in Trebilcock and York, eds, Fair Exchange at 226 (cited in note 14).
" Article 6(c) of the draft Agreement on Safeguards (cited in note 17) defines "serious
injury" as a "significant overall impact on the condition of a domestic industry."
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sequently, agreement could still be reached even with a more re-
strictive escape clause that reduced the negotiators' expected
utilities'and the level of ex post protection. Such analysis suggests
that incremental restrictions on the "states of the world" in which
Article XIX may be invoked can reduce the amount of protection
that results from Article XIX ex post without destroying its ability
to facilitate trade concessions ex ante. Proposals to confine the
concept of "serious injury" offer one way to impose such incremen-
tal restrictions, and thus have some appeal.
On the other hand, results derived from the model in the Ap-
pendix are subject to an important caveat. That model considers
negotiations over a single pair of reciprocal concessions. But GATT
embodies thousands of concessions and only a single Article XIX
"escape clause," again no doubt a reflection of the transaction
costs of bargaining. The distinct possibility arises that some con-
cessions are "marginal," in the sense that negotiators are just
barely willing to make them given the existing structure of the
GATT escape clause. If so, any additional restrictions on the abil-
ity of signatories to escape ex post may thwart some concessions ex
ante, and the ex ante costs may exceed the ex post gain. The end
result of the analysis is thus quite inconclusive, and one cannot be
sure that incremental restrictions upon the concept of serious in-
jury would lower the overall costs of production.
B. Remedy, Compensation, and Retaliation
Several recent proposals for reform of safeguards policy would
prohibit discrimination in the remedies that a signatory may em-
ploy under Article XIX. Other proposals would abandon in part
the current provisions requiring the importing nation to provide
compensation or else suffer measured retaliation after a safeguards
action. Such changes to the safeguards regime are potentially det-
rimental, however, because they may reduce the ability of Article
XIX to facilitate trade concessions ex ante and unduly increase the
number of safeguards actions ex post.
1. Selectivity.
The most prominent issue in the current Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations over safeguards policy is "selectivity.' 100 The dispute
concerns the question whether Article XIX allows or should allow
I00 See Sampson, Safeguards, in Finger and Olechowski, eds, The Uruguay Round at
148 (cited in note 6).
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signatories to "escape" not only from tariff bindings and prohibi-
tions upon quotas and other quantitative restrictions, but also
from GATT Articles I and XIII, which require signatories to apply
protective measures on a nondiscriminatory or "most-favored na-
tion" (MFN) basis. If the MFN principle applies to safeguards
measures, then all foreign suppliers must be treated similarly-any
tariff rate increase must apply equally to imports from every na-
tion, and any quota must be allocated among nations based on
their pre-quota market shares.101 If the MFN principle does not
apply, by contrast, then tariffs, quotas, and other protective meas-
ures may be applied "selectively."
GATT scholars have debated for a number of years whether
Article XIX implicitly embodies a prohibition on selectivity. 0 2
Whatever the proper resolution of that debate, many nations have
complained through the years that safeguards measures in fact dis-
criminate against them, 0 3 and various proposals have emerged
during the Uruguay Round (and before) to prohibit selectivity.10
Defenders of selectivity argue in response that protective measures
under Article XIX should apply primarily to the "guilty" na-
tions-those that have increased their exports and have caused the
injury. 105
The draft Agreement on Safeguards does not resolve the issue
definitively. It provides that safeguards measures shall apply to
products "irrespective of their source," except under "exceptional
circumstances."'' 0 The "exceptional circumstances" language is en-
closed in brackets, to indicate its controversial and unsettled status
among the negotiators and the need for further high-level political
discussions.
Because of the linkage between the opportunities to escape ex
post and the level of trade concessions ex ante, the effects of selec-
tivity upon the economic welfare of the GATT community are un-
clear. The reason relates to the fact that discriminatory safeguards
measures may at times be optimal ex ante. As noted, an optimal
agreement from the perspective of the negotiators will permit the
101 GATT Art XIII.
101 Excerpts from a number of writings on the subject may be found in Jackson and
Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at 595-606 (cited in note 11).
103 See Sampson, Safeguards, in Finger and Olechowski, eds, The Uruguay Round at
148 (cited in note 6).
10 See, for example, 6 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 869 (cited in note 6).
100 See Sampson, Safeguards, in Finger and Olechowski, eds, The Uruguay Round at
148 (cited in note 6).
206 Draft Agreement on Safeguards Art 5 (cited in note 17).
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revocation of concessions when the gains to officials in the import-
ing nation exceed the costs to officials abroad. There is no reason
to suppose that the political consequences of protection are compa-
rable for officials in all exporting nations, and an optimal agree-
ment might then concentrate the effects of protection on those na-
tions where the adverse political consequences are the smallest.
Because safeguards measures tend to be less politically harmful to
officials in exporting countries where the exporters are doing rela-
tively well (or perhaps where exporters have less political voice),
discrimination against those countries may tend to be politically
optimal ex ante. Signatories that confront a likelihood of discrimi-
nation against them ex post can be compensated ex ante with con-
cessions on other matters. It follows that the opportunity for signa-
tories to utilize selective safeguards measures may facilitate trade
concessions, and that a prohibition on selective action might
thwart some concessions ex ante. Likewise, the practice of restrict-
ing most sharply the imports from nations that have recently in-
creased their exports may sometimes be an appropriate way to
discriminate.
Yet, as many economists have noted, considerable economic
benefits ordinarily flow from adherence to the MFN principle. If
country A imposes a 10 percent tariff on widgets from country B
and a 20 percent tariff on widgets from country C, and if the mar-
ket for widgets in country A is substantial, then the result may be
to encourage investment in widget production in country B even
though producers in countty C are more efficient. Considerable
deadweight losses may result. A uniform tariff preserves the rela-
tive competitive positions of foreign suppliers and avoids encourag-
ing such inefficient investments.10 7 Further, safeguards measures
that discriminate against nations that increase their exports tend
to penalize precisely those exporters that have done the most to
improve their efficiency, thus lessening the incentive to become
more efficient.'08 While selectivity may have favorable ex ante ef-
107 Discrimination in international trade has become increasingly important generally
with the formation of customs unions such as the European Community and free trade
agreements such as the one between the United States and Canada. Useful economic refer-
ences on the theory of customs unions and their welfare consequences include R.G. Lipsey,
The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey, 70 Econ J 496 (1960); and Bhagwati
and Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade at 271-90 (cited in note 28).
108 To be sure, the significance of discrimination through temporary protective meas-
ures should not be exaggerated. If protection is temporary (and anticipated to be temporary
at the time of its imposition), then the effect of discriminatory measures on investment
incentives abroad will be more modest. Selective safeguards measures thus likely impose
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fects on the level of trade concessions, therefore, its ex post welfare
effects are more unfavorable than the effects of nondiscriminatory
measures. The net impact of selectivity on the economic welfare of
the GATT community thus appears ambiguous.
2. Compensation, retaliation, and the proliferation of VERs.
Recent commentary is increasingly hostile to the compensa-
tion and retaliation provisions of Article XIX. The compensation
requirement is said to be too onerous for importing nations, thus
encouraging them to circumvent GATT by negotiating VERs
outside the auspices of GATT. Such agreements, the argument
runs, distort trade more severely than do measures taken in com-
pliance with Article XIX because of their selectivity and their typ-
ically open-ended duration. To reduce the incentive for signatories
to circumvent Article XIX, therefore, some commentators urge the
elimination of the compensation and retaliation provisions, at least
under certain conditions.109
The draft Agreement on Safeguards affords an interesting re-
sponse to these proposals. Initially, it preserves the existing com-
pensation and retaliation structure of Article XIX, affording signa-
tories the right to withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions"
if negotiations over compensation fail."' If the duration of the
safeguards action is less than three years, however, the right to
"suspend" concessions is withheld, although the requirement to
negotiate over compensation remains."' Additional bracketed (un-
settled) language embodies a prohibition on trade restrictions that
do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement on Safe-
guards, or other provisions of GATT."2 Although no sanctions for
failure to comply are included, this language is plainly an effort to
eliminate VERs that operate outside the formal ambit of Article
XIX." 3 The draft agreement permits quantitative restrictions as a
substantially smaller welfare losses on the trading community than lasting violations of the
MFN principle.
109 See, for example, Lawrence and Litan, Saving Free Trade at 102-03 (cited in note
15) (arguing for the suspension of the compensation requirement "when member countries
establish quasi-legal procedures for determining whether domestic industries are entitled to
temporary relief," and when "the form of relief is limited to declining and nondiscrimina-
tory tariffs . . ."); Richardson, Safeguards Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, in
Baldwin and Richardson, eds, Issues in the Uruguay Round at 26-27 (cited in note 13);
Hufbauer, Trade Policy for Troubled Industries at 60-61 (cited in note 15); Jackson, The
World Trading System at 185 (cited in note 59).
110 See draft Agreement on Safeguards Arts 17-18 (cited in note 17).
111 Id at Art 19.
112 Id at Arts 24-25.
113 It is questionable whether such prohibitions will have much effect. VERs represent a
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safeguards remedy," 4 however, which in effect allows signatories to
utilize VERs subject to the time limits applicable generally to safe-
guards measures.115
Like the reforms discussed earlier, the merits of the various
proposals to relax the compensation and retaliation requirements
and the tentative response to them in the draft Agreement on
Safeguards are difficult to assess. To be sure, the economic critique
of VERs is compelling. Because VERs allocate quantitative limits
on exports among participating countries and do not afford them
an opportunity to compete on equal terms as would a nondiscrimi-
natory tariff, the investment-distorting consequences of discrimi-
natory protection usually follow. Further, unlike formal measures
under Article XIX, VERs are of open-ended duration, which exac-
erbates the welfare consequences of the protection that they afford
and any discrimination that accompanies it.
But it does not follow that elimination of the compensation
and retaliation requirements of Article XIX will improve matters,
even if the result is diminished resort to VERs in favor of formal
safeguards action. Recall the justification for a compensation re-
quirement suggested by the earlier model of the escape clause. If
state-contingent "escape" agreements were costless to negotiate, a
requirement of ex post compensation would be unnecessary. Nego-
tiators would simply specify in detail ex ante the circumstances
under which permanent or temporary avoidance of GATT obliga-
tions would be permitted. But such detailed agreements are costly,
and general guidelines for "escape" such as the "serious injury"
and "increased quantities" requirements are highly imperfect sub-
stitutes for detailed state-contingent provisions. Consequently, Ar-
ticle XIX does not permit the avoidance of obligations without ex
post penalty.116 This system assuredly differs from an idealized ex
form of renegotiation under GATT that will be difficult to avoid under any circumstances.
Officials in importing nations seek VERs for political gain and may well continue to do so
regardless of the provisions of a final Agreement on Safeguards. Exporting countries receive
a bribe for entering VERs in the form of quota rents, and may thus be quite content to
enter them. In the end, regardless of the letter of GATT, VERs are most difficult to police
because often there is no one to complain. This observation explains why proposals aimed at
reducing the use of VERs often rely on the "carrot" rather than the "stick," as by eliminat-
ing the compensation and retaliation provisions of Article XIX to make formal safeguards
action more attractive.
114 Draft Agreement on Safeguards Art 8 (cited in note 17).
1 The negotiators have not resolved the issue of the time limits, and bracketed lan-
guage suggests that a controversy remains as to whether the total duration of safeguards
action including extensions shall be limited to five years or eight years. Id at Art 11. Under
present U.S. law, for example, an eight-year limit is imposed. See 19 USC § 2253(e)(1)(a).
110 As Jackson notes, "the international rules, centered in GATT, concerning so-called
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ante agreement but is perhaps the best that can be designed under
the circumstances to ensure that signatories do not take opportu-
nistic advantage of the escape clause ex post by revoking conces-
sions when the political costs to officials in exporting nations ex-
ceed the political gains to officials in importing nations.
The elimination of penalties for the avoidance of obligations
would increase the propensity of signatories to make opportunistic
use of Article XIX. The number of protective actions ex post
would increase, along with the deadweight costs of protection.
Likewise, because of the prospect of heightened opportunism, the
ex ante value of trade concessions would diminish, thus reducing
the returns to the negotiation process and potentially reducing the
number of reciprocal concessions.
VERs, by contrast, provide exporting nations with some com-
pensation. The typical VER utilizes quotas that provide the ex-
porting country with quota rents on allowable sales. These rents
partially or fully offset the loss of profits due to the reduction in
the volume of exports. The presence of such implicit compensation
helps to maintain harmony and reduces the prospect of trade wars.
Indeed, it explains why exporting nations are willing to enter the
agreements in the first place. 117 Further, the loss of quota rents is a
burden on the economy of the importing nation and creates some
disincentive to take protective action, the magnitude of which de-
pends on the incidence of the burden on various interest groups.
This disincentive, like the compensation and retaliation provisions
of Articles XIX and XXVIII, tends to discourage protection, un-
safeguards and the problems of economic 'structural' adjustment, are too weak and ambigu-
ous to provide an effective level of discipline ...although some measure of discipline
through the GATT system and its 'compensation rules' has been effective." Jackson, The
World Trading System at 184 (cited in note 59).
m Recent U.S. experience is illustrative. The United States invoked Article XIX when
it negotiated a network of voluntary restraint agreements on steel imports, and negotiated
restraints upon Japanese automobile imports outside the formal ambit of Article XIX. See
sources cited in notes 7 and 10. In both cases, trading partners ultimately acceded to U.S.
pressure to restrict their exports without retaliating against the United States on other
products.
In contrast, the United States in 1986 imposed a 35 percent protective tariff (decreasing
progressively to 8 percent after five years) on red cedar shakes and shingle imports from
Canada. Because the tariff was not bound under GATT, the U.S. did not need to invoke
Article XIX. See President Orders Higher Tariffs on Shakes, Shingles From Canada, Mod-
ifying ITC Proposal, 3 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 708 (1986). It offered no compensation to
Canada, with the result that Canada retaliated by increasing tariffs (estimated at $80 mil-
lion yearly) on a variety of U.S. exports. See Duties on U.S. Computer Parts, Publications
Imposed in Retaliation For Shinglefs], Shakes, 3 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 734 (1986).
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less it affords considerable political gains to officials in the import-
ing nation.
Another virtue of the compensation and retaliation provisions
under Article XIX is that they often result in compensatory trade
concessions.11 Plainly, the adverse welfare effects of safeguards
measures ex post are reduced or even eliminated when trade barri-
ers on some products decline as the quid pro quo.
Thus, even accepting the premise that the compensation and
retaliation provisions of Article XIX encourage resort to VERs, the
abandonment of those provisions might actually make matters
worse. These provisions are important to control opportunistic be-
havior and to maintain harmony within the GATT system. VERs,
with their implicit compensation in the form of quota rents, have
much the same virtue, whatever their vices. Despite the extensive
criticism of the compensation and retaliation provisions and the
various proposals for their modification or abandonment, there-
fore, it is neither surprising nor clearly unfortunate that the draft
Agreement responds to those proposals rather tentatively. 119
CONCLUSION
The economic case for free trade is compelling, but Article
XIX cannot be condemned simply because it affords some oppor-
tunity for protective actions. Trade policy is formulated by self-
interested political officials acting under conditions of uncertainty;
the opportunity to revoke trade concessions if the political gains
are great will increase the willingness of officials to make conces-
sions in the first instance. Some manner of escape clause is an un-
derstandable and potentially desirable component of trade-liberal-
izing agreements.
A politically Pareto optimal escape clause would not allow
parties to revoke concessions at will, but constrains escape to cir-
cumstances in which the gains to the party avoiding concessions
exceed the costs to its trading partners. The most prominent fea-
tures of Article XIX-the injury test and the compensation and
retaliation provisions-constitute efforts to impose such a con-
18 See Jackson and Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at
606-07 (cited in note 11).
I8 As noted, the requirement to negotiate compensation survives in all cases, and the
right to retaliate if negotiations fail survives for safeguards actions that exceed three years.
Historically, escape clause actions have tended to exceed three years in duration, at least in
the United States. In a sample of 19 cases going back to 1954, the shortest duration of relief
was three years, in three cases. Relief lasted four years in seven cases, five years in four
cases, and nine, eleven, twelve, and thirteen years in one case each. Hufbauer, Trade Policy
for Troubled Industries at 46 (cited in note 15).
[58:255
1991] Protectionism as a Safeguard 299
straint in a contracting environment where complete state-contin-
gent contracts are too costly. Not surprisingly the draft Agreement
on Safeguards embodies much the same approach.
Recommendations for reform of Article XIX must be evalu-
ated in light of this understanding of the function of the escape
clause. The wisdom of the reforms suggested by various commen-
tators depends to a considerable degree on whether the reforms
would unduly restrict the ability of trade policy officials to avoid
specific GATT obligations when the political stakes are especially
high, or undermine efforts to discourage opportunistic escape.
These judgments are difficult to make, and are perhaps best made
elsewhere in the course of future GATT negotiations. The analysis
in this Article simply cautions that any reforms in safeguards pol-
icy can have important consequences "ex ante" as well as "ex
post," and must be evaluated accordingly.
The University of Chicago Law Review
APPENDIX A
A simple model can illuminate the effects of the escape clause
on trade negotiations and suggest the properties of a politically
Pareto optimal escape clause. To minimize complexity, the model
suppresses the distinction between Article XIX and other methods
for the revocation of concessions under GATT.
The model requires no assumptions about the form of govern-
ment in each country, only an assumption that governing officials
suffer political losses from increased import competition, ceteris
paribus, and reap political gains from increased exports. The
model also suppresses all hierarchy and division within the govern-
ments of the negotiating countries, and any attendant agency is-
sues. Thus, for example, differing preferences between a legislative
and executive branch are ignored, as is the problem of motivating
the negotiator to pursue the interests of political superiors. These
obvious simplifications do not destroy the usefulness of the model
as long as the negotiators are at least somewhat responsive to the
political interests of superiors, and the negotiators' various "princi-
pals" have some mutual political interests that the bargain can
promote.
Consider then a bilateral negotiation between representatives
of countries A and B to reduce the tariff rates on two products, one
exported from country A to country B, and one exported from
country B to country A. For simplicity, let the negotiators face a
dichotomous choice between "protection" (the status quo) and a
reciprocal agreement for "no protection."
Each negotiator has a utility function (uA and uB, respec-
tively), the units of which might be, for example, dollar campaign
contributions or votes-the exact nature of the utility functions is
unimportant here. Both negotiators are expected utility maximiz-
ers. Assume further for simplicity that an agreement to eliminate
protection will be reached if both negotiators are indifferent be-
tween the agreement and the status quo ante.
Let the utility from the status quo ante equal X for country
A's negotiator, and x for country B's negotiator. If they agree to
eliminate protection, each country's negotiator will enjoy an incre-
mental increase in utility because home market exporters will in-
crease their sales abroad. Let this gain equal Y for country A's ne-
gotiator and y for country B's negotiator. For simplicity, X, x, Y,
and y are assumed to be known with certainty.
The reciprocal concession also results in an incremental loss of
utility for each negotiator because import-competing firms in the
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home market face greater competition. But the exact magnitude of
this utility loss is uncertain at the time of the negotiations. It de-
pends upon the eventual "state of the world," a random variable 0,
which has a probability distribution known to both negotiators.
Define the utility loss due to increased import competition in the
home market as C(O) for country A's negotiator and c(0) for coun-
try B's negotiator.1
In the absence of an escape clause, country A's negotiator
would agree to eliminate protection if and only if the expected util-
ity from the agreement at least equals the utility of the status quo
ante-that is, if and only if2
EOuA = E[X+Y-C()] > X
Likewise, country B's negotiator would agree if and only if
E~uB = E 0[x+y-c()] > x
Quite possibly, one or both conditions will not be met, and the
negotiators will not reach an agreement.
Now consider the role of an escape clause, which may be for-
malized as follows. The escape clause is a set of functions e(8) =
[eA(O),eB(O)] which the negotiators select during the course of their
negotiations, and which determines whether each concession will
be revoked or not after the "state of the world" is revealed. Each
function has a value equal to zero or one-when el(0) is equal to
zero, i=A,B, the agreement by country i to eliminate protection
remains in place; when it is equal to one, the agreement is revoked.
Assume for simplicity that "escape" from either concession simply
eliminates the political cost of' the concession to officials in the im-
porting country [eliminates C(O) or c(0) as the case may be], and
eliminates the political gain to officials in the exporting country (Y
or y as the case may be).
Plainly, the escape clause facilitates initial agreement. From
the perspective of country A's negotiator, expected utility with an
escape clause is equal to
EOuA = E0IX + [I-eB(O)]Y - [-eA(O)]C(8)1
For country B's negotiator, expected utility is equal to
EuB = E01x + [1-eA(O)]y - [1-eBO)]C(o)(
Thus, imagine a choice of e(O) such that eA(O) and eB(O) both equal
1 This formulation, with c(O) a function of a random variable and y known with cer-
tainty, entails no loss of generality. If one supposes that the political gains on the export
side (y) are also uncertain, one can simply incorporate the stochastic component of y into
c(B).
C The term "E" is the expectation operator, so that the expression Eox means "the
expected value of x, taken over the probability distribution of the possible states of the
world 0."
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1 for every state of the world in which Y-C(O)<0 or y-c(O)<0.
Such an escape clause guarantees the willingness of both negotia-
tors to sign the agreement by ensuring them an expected utility at
least equal to what they receive in the status quo ante.3
Equally clearly and, indeed, equivalently, the introduction of
an escape clause allows the negotiators to achieve a Pareto im-
provement over an irrevocable commitment to liberalize trade, for
an irrevocable commitment is equivalent to an escape clause with
ei()=O, all 0, i=A,B. The opportunity to vary the ei(O) with 0 can
only benefit the negotiators.
To provide further characterization of the Pareto optimal es-
cape clause, let 0 have a continuous probability distribution F(O)
with density function f(0). A Pareto optimal agreement represents
a choice of e(O) to:
Max EOuA
subject to EBuB > x
ei()=O or ei(O)=I, i=A,B
To solve this problem, it is useful to suppose counterfactually that
the ei(0) may assume fractional values between zero and one, and
thus to replace the last constraint by 1 > ei(0) > 0, i=A,B. The
problem thus formulated is a familiar one in control theory.
Define AA(O) C(O)f(0) - Xyf(O), and define AB(O) -Yf(O) +
Xc(O)f(O), where X is a constant. The expression AA(O) may be inter-
preted as the net effect of "escape" from country A's concession in
state 0 upon the expected welfare of the negotiators: The term
C(0)f(0) is simply the effect of escape on the utility of country A's
negotiator multiplied by the probability of state 0. The term
-Xyf(0) has a corresponding interpretation as the effect of escape on
the expected utility of country B's negotiator, multiplied by X,
which is the "shadow price" of utility to country B's negotiator in
units of the utility function for his counterpart from country A.
The expression AB(O) has a corresponding interpretation as the ef-
fect of "escape" from country B's concession in state 0 upon the
expected welfare of the negotiators.
The solution to the problem has the following properties: For 0
for which AA>O, eA(O) =1; for 0 for which AA<O, eA(O) =0; and for 0
for which AA=O, all values of eA(O) between zero ard one are non-
' Of course, it is possible that such an escape clause would allow escape from both
concessions in every state of the world, and thus be equivalent to the absence of an agree-
ment. But assuming that trade negotiations are worth initiating in the first place, some
states of the world will typically exist in which the negotiators benefit from leaving one or
both concessions in place.
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uniquely optimal. A corresponding condition holds for AB, substi-
tuting eB(O) for eA(O). 4 And, because each control function ei(O) al-
ways has an optimal value of zero or one for each 0 (although
sometimes either value may be non-uniquely optimal), the
counterfactual formulation of the constraint on the ei(O) does not
produce an infeasible solution.
4 Such a solution is known as a "bang-bang" control. See, for example, Morton I.
Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Dynamic Optimization 186-91 (North Holland, 1981);
Michael D. Intriligator, Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory 357-58 (Pren-
tice-Hall, 1971).
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix utilizes the model developed in Appendix A to
illustrate why incremental restrictions on "escape" will not usually
thwart agreement, and thus suggests that such restrictions can en-
hance welfare. For simplicity, assume that the social welfare gain
to each nation from each trade concession is the same in all states
of the world, and that the welfare loss from the revocation of each
concession is the same in all states of the world. Assume further
that each country enjoys a welfare gain as a result of its own con-
cession exactly equal to the welfare gain that it enjoys as a result
of the other country's concession, so that the revocation of its own
concession carries the same welfare cost as the revocation of the
other country's concession.' Thus, for both countries, one might
define the "second-best" escape clause as one that minimizes the
sum of the probabilities of "escape" for the two concessions, sub-
ject to the constraint that escape not be made so difficult that the
negotiators refuse to strike the initial agreement to liberalize trade.
Such a "second-best" escape clause would represent the solution
to:,
min E0 [eA(O) + eB(O)1
subject to EOuA - X
EeuB > x
The sum of the probabilities of escape under such a "second-
best" escape clause is almost certainly lower than under the escape
clause that the negotiators will choose for themselves, given that
the negotiators have no desire to minimize the sum of these
probabilities, but only to maximize their political self-interest. For-
mally, let 8(0) solve this second-best problem, and let 6(0) be
Pareto optimal from the negotiator's perspective. Assume, as will
typically be the case, that the negotiators enjoy strictly greater ex-
pected utility under 6(0) than under 8(0). It is then often possible
to modify 6(0) by setting 6A(0 ) and 6B(0) equal to zero for some
state or states 0, while still allowing both negotiators to enjoy at
least the utility that they enjoy in the status quo ante. The sum of
the probabilities of escape under such an appropriately modified
version of 6(0) would be less than the sum under 6(0) itself. It fol-
lows that the sum of the probabilities under 6(0) will be less than
the sum of the probabilities under 6(0).
1 In other words, the welfare gain to each country from the lowering of barriers to its
exports equals the welfare gain from reducing its own barriers to imports.
2 Here, because ei(O)=1 in the event of "escape" and zero otherwise, the probability of
escape from the concession by country i is simply the expectation of el(O).
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In short, if it were possible to impose a slightly more restric-
tive escape clause on the negotiators, social welfare could be en-
hanced. Agreement could still be reached, yet the probabilities of
"escape" would decline. Put differently, the escape clause could be
modified so that trade liberalization would occur to the same ex-
tent ex ante, and the revocation of concessions would occur to a
lesser extent ex post.

